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I. Introduction 
Over the last four decades, numerous commentators have 
criticized the institution of executive clemency.1 Opponents of 
                                                                                                     
 * Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation; M.P.P., George 
Washington University, 2010; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1980; B.A., Washington 
& Lee University, 1977. I was one of the lawyers for the United States in Herrera 
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). The views expressed in this article are the author’s 
own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The 
Heritage Foundation. John Malcolm, John-Michael Seibler, and Christina 
Tacoronti offered valuable comments on an earlier version of this article. John-
Michael Seibler and Ryan Tactac provided excellent research assistance. Any 
errors are mine. 
 1. See generally JEFFREY P. CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 
(2009); Albert W. Alschuler, Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon Party, 100 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1131 (2010); Margaret C. Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169 (2010); Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the 
Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593 (2013). Such 
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capital punishment have been particularly vocal. Their principal 
complaint has been that, with a few isolated exceptions,2 far too 
many chief executives have granted condemned prisoners 
clemency far too infrequently.3 This is an unfortunate 
                                                                                                     
criticism is not an entirely new phenomenon. See, e.g., James P. Goodrich, Use 
and Abuse of the Power to Pardon, 11 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 334, 
335 (1920–1921) (“Thoughtful persons fear that a maudlin sentimentality may go 
too far in the direction of mercy and lay too little emphasis on the necessity of 
certain and inflexible punishment for violated law.”). 
 2. Several governors have issued a mass clemency to all death row 
prisoners. Three governors—Tony Anaya of New Mexico, Richard Celeste of Ohio, 
and George Ryan of Illinois—commuted the sentence of every condemned 
prisoner in their states just before leaving office. Two governors—Jon Corzine of 
New Jersey and Pat Quinn of Illinois—commuted the death sentences of every 
prisoner on death row just before signing separate bills repealing capital 
punishment in their respective states. In 2015, Maryland Governor Martin 
O’Malley commuted the death sentence of every death row inmate after the state 
repealed capital punishment, but did not make that legislation retroactive. See 
Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 259 (1990–1991) (noting the 1986 mass commutation 
by New Mexico Governor Tony Anaya); Michael Heise, The Death of Death Row 
Clemency and the Evolving Politics of Unequal Grace, 66 ALA. L. REV. 949, 956, 
980 (2015) [hereinafter Heise, Unequal Grace] (explaining how Illinois Governor 
George Ryan removed inmates from death row because of concerns about the 
possibility of executing innocent prisoners); Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On 
Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of 
Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2004) (calling George Ryan’s mass 
commutation “the single sharpest blow to capital punishment since the United 
States Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 1972”); DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) 
(tracking clemency statistics by state) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Critics have faulted those exercises of the clemency power too. See 
generally David A. Wallace, Dead Men Walking—An Abuse of Executive Clemency 
Power in Illinois, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 379 (2004). 
 3. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1123, 1124 (2012) (“[B]etween 1923 and 1972 Texas executed 461 people . . . 
[and] . . . commuted 100 capital sentences . . . . Since 1976, when the United 
States reinstated the death penalty, Texas has executed 477 people . . . [and] 
granted clemency [twice] . . . .”) (footnotes omitted). See generally Michael A.G. 
Korengold et al., And Justice for Few: The Collapse of the Capital Clemency 
System in the United States, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 349 (1996); Victoria J. Palacios, 
Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court’s Reliance on Commutation to Ensure 
Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1996); Michael L. Radelet 
& Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 289 (1993); Stephen E. Silverman, Note, There is Nothing Certain 
Like Death in Texas: State Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death 
Row Inmates’ Last Appeals, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 375 (1995). There are three forms of 
clemency in capital cases: (1) a reprieve, which merely postpones execution; (2) a 
commutation, which can reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment, with or 
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development—critics argue—one due entirely to the politicization 
of criminal justice, particularly on the subject of capital 
punishment.4 Governors are unwilling to risk their political future 
by commuting the sentences of condemned prisoners absent proof 
of their innocence—the argument goes—because they anticipate 
receiving few political benefits from extending mercy to killers,5 
and they fear being tarred with the label “soft on crime” in their 
next campaign.6 Perhaps what frightens governors most of all—
critics maintain—is the prospect that commuting a condemned 
prisoner’s sentence could ultimately lead to his release and his 
commission of new, horrific, but preventable, crimes.7 
                                                                                                     
without the possibility of parole, or a lesser sentence; and (3) a pardon, which 
releases an offender from custody. See Elkan Abramotiz & David Paget, Executive 
Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 137–38 (1964) (describing 
executive clemency). 
 4. See Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due 
Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 280–
81 (1994) (examining the political pressures associated with death penalty 
decisions). 
 5. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE 
LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 190 (2015) (“As Senator James Webb (D-VA) 
once said at a conference on prisoner reentry, ‘The question is about fear. And I 
think it pervades the political process.’”). 
 6. For example, in 1992 then-Governor Bill Clinton suspended his 
presidential campaign to return to Arkansas for the execution of Ricky Rector, a 
brain damaged prisoner who put his last meal dessert aside “for later,” so that he 
could not be labeled “soft on crime”—a label that hurt Michael Dukakis’ 
presidential efforts four years earlier. See James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, 
May God—or the Governor—Have Mercy: Executive Clemency and Executions in 
Modern Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 200, 200–01 (2000) (noting that 
Rector would occasionally lapse into “crazed fits of barking and howling”); 
Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105, 105 (“Bill 
Clinton had to prove that he was a Democrat who could handle mainstream 
priorities—including the death penalty.”). See generally Cathleen Burnett, The 
Failed Failsafe: The Politics of Executive Clemency, 8 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 191 
(2003); Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive 
Justice: Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 
25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413, 436, 444–45 (1999); Paul J. 
Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 
874–80 (2016) [hereinafter Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency] (describing political 
influences in clemency); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and 
Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 731–35, 756–63 (2013) 
(describing political influences in criminal justice policy generally).  
 7. That concern is not hypothetical. See, e.g., EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN, 
PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR’S EDUCATION ON DEATH ROW iii, 90–
115 (1989) (describing the case of Edward Wein, a multiple rapist and murderer, 
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This Article maintains that these criticisms are unfounded or 
overstated. Part II describes the new procedures that the federal 
and state governments have instituted to satisfy constitutional 
capital sentencing requirements that did not exist when governors 
regularly granted condemned prisoners clemency. Part II also 
identifies some of the criticisms leveled against the use of clemency 
in capital cases over the last forty years. Part III addresses the 
question of whether governors should use their clemency power 
whenever there is a risk that a condemned prisoner is innocent. 
Part III concludes that a governor should not merely grant 
clemency, but also issue a pardon to any offender who proves to be 
innocent of his crime, but notes that the instances in which that 
scenario might occur are few and far between. Part IV deals with 
the argument that chief executives have failed to sift out those 
cases in which death is an inappropriate penalty for a particular 
offender. It concludes that, given the numerous opportunities for 
the jury and state courts to spare those offenders, there is far less 
need today for a governor to second-guess the unanimous view of 
the local community and state judiciary that a death sentence is 
the appropriate punishment. Finally, critics do not address the 
horrific facts of some capital cases—facts that can signify that 
death is the appropriate penalty. 
II. Capital Punishment and Clemency 
A. The History of American Capital Punishment 
Capital punishment for heinous crimes and executive 
clemency for condemned prisoners have co-existed throughout the 
                                                                                                     
who raped and killed one woman and attempted to murder another, crimes made 
possible only because California Governor Pat Brown had commuted his original 
death sentence); Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of 
Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 823 (2015) (noting that former Arkansas 
Governor Mike Huckabee commuted an offender’s sentence, the inmate was later 
released, and afterwards he murdered four police officers); Jailhouse Nation, 
ECONOMIST (June 20, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21654619-
how-make-americas-penal-system-less-punitive-and-more-effective-jailhouse-
nation (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (“One reason Michael Dukakis was never 
president was that a murderer called Willie Horton, who was released on furlough 
while Mr. Dukakis was governor of Massachusetts, took the opportunity to rape 
someone.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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history of Western Civilization.8 The two institutions have always 
co-existed in an opposing manner: one symbolizing society’s 
abhorrence of certain conduct,9 and the other signaling that 
sometimes mercy can adequately promote society’s criminal justice 
needs.10 Capital punishment has been defended on the ground that 
it serves several different purposes of punishment: retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and education.11 Executive clemency 
for condemned prisoners has been justified on the ground that it 
serves purposes that the criminal justice system cannot satisfy.12 
                                                                                                     
 8. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197–98 (1971) 
(explaining that death was the mandatory penalty for felonies at common law), 
reh’g granted and judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 
408 U.S. 941 (1972); Genesis 4:8–16 (telling how after Cain murdered Abel, God 
granted Cain the Mark of Cain so that he would not be killed by others); Exodus 
21:12 (“Whoever strikes a man so that he dies shall be put to death.”); Matthew 
27:20 (saying Pontius Pilate pardoned Barabbas instead of Jesus); 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201 (noting that, at common law, death was the 
punishment for murder), id. at *397–440 (discussing the crown’s authority to 
grant clemency); CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, FORGIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXPLORATION xviii n.10 (2007) (explaining that Julius Caesar granted clemency 
to some conquered nations); John Milton, Paradise Lost, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
MILTON bk. X 307 (F. Patterson ed., 1931) (“[T]emper . . . Justice with 
Mercie . . . .”). See generally NAOMI D. HURNAND, THE KING’S PARDON FOR 
HOMICIDE BEFORE AD 1307 (1970). 
 9. In Gregg v. Georgia, the lead opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart 
concluded that “the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate 
sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community’s belief that certain 
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate 
response may be the penalty of death.” 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976). Justice Stewart 
reached that conclusion in the context of justifying capital punishment on 
retributive grounds. Id. The rationale is that, in executing an offender, 
particularly for some of the hideous crimes that condemned prisoners have 
committed, see infra text accompanying notes 146–156 and Appendix C, the 
sovereign demarks certain conduct as being so far beyond the limits of even 
“ordinary” homicide that it must signify its abhorrence by declaring that the 
offender is no longer fit to live in society. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927)  
A pardon . . . is not a private act of grace from an individual happening 
to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When 
granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the 
public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the 
judgment fixed. 
 11. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, 175 n.20 (describing the purposes of capital 
punishment as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation).  
 12. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (calling clemency a 
“relief mechanism” for the fallible justice system). 
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It acts as an external “fail safe”13 for mistaken convictions and 
unduly severe punishments; it allows the chief executive discretion 
to override the decisions of prosecutors, juries, and judges, and to 
impose his own stamp on the criminal justice system; and it allows 
mercy to trump justice even when a conviction and sentence cannot 
be deemed flawed or unduly harsh.14 Both practices have been in 
existence in the United States from the nation’s earliest days.15  
At common law, death was the mandatory punishment for 
every felony.16 The American colonies, which inherited the 
                                                                                                     
 13. Id. (quoting KATHLEEN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 131 (1989)). 
 14. See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (“Executive 
clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the 
operation or enforcement of the criminal law.”); In re Flournoy, 1 Ga. 606, 607 
(1846) (“[A pardon] proceeds upon the idea of innocence . . . And as all good 
governments are founded upon essential equity, the sovereign authority will not 
permit, so far as it can be prevented consistently with the maintenance of general 
laws, injustice to be done.”); Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 6, at 848–
50 (“Presidents have extended offenders [clemency] for a host of reasons: as 
correction for an errant conviction or unduly severe punishment, . . . [because] a 
lesser punishment better serves the nation’s interests, . . . [to] demonstrate[] that 
he oversees the operation of the criminal law, or simply as an act of grace.”); 
Williams W. Smithers, Nature and Limits of the Pardoning Power, 1 J. AM. INST. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 549 (1911) (surveying the justifications for clemency); 
Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and 
the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 89 (2002) (“[P]ardons may be 
issued when justice would otherwise not be served either because the sentence 
was too harsh or because the person was wrongly convicted.”). Presidents have 
also used their clemency power in matters of state. See Larkin, Revitalizing 
Clemency, supra note 6, at 850–51, 850 n.55. 
 15. See, e.g., Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 3, 8–10, 14, 23, 1 Stat. 112 (1790) 
(imposing mandatory capital punishment for various crimes, such as: treason; 
murder within exclusive federal jurisdiction; murder or robbery on the high seas; 
piracy; being an accomplice to murder, robbery, or piracy on the high seas; 
counterfeiting; and using force to help a condemned prisoner escape); United 
States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833) (“As this [clemency] power had been 
exercised, from time immemorial, by the executive of that nation whose language 
is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; 
we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon . . . .”); 
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 53–62 (2002) 
(describing capital punishment and clemency in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century America); CROUCH, supra note 1, at 12–19 (describing the Framers’ 
opinions regarding clemency); HUGH F. RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN 
THE GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 105–10, 121–22, 171 (1965) 
(describing capital punishment and clemency in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century Virginia). 
 16. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197–98 (1971), reh’g granted and 
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common law,17 also used capital punishment for various crimes, 
such as treason, murder, piracy, arson, robbery, and burglary.18 
Juries, however, disliked seeing a mandatory death sentence in 
cases where the offender did not deserve to die and would refuse to 
convict a defendant if doing so would send him to the gallows.19 
The federal and state governments responded to those decisions 
over time by progressively modifying their criminal laws in 
different ways. 
The first step was to redefine the crime of capital murder. Late 
in the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania divided capital murder 
into two degrees, with death as the penalty only for first-degree 
murder, then classified as a “willful, deliberate and premeditated” 
homicide.20 Other states followed in Pennsylvania’s wake to limit 
a mandatory death penalty to the most heinous offenses.21 That 
reform, however, did not work. Denied the discretion to impose a 
punishment less than death for even a newly-limited category of 
capital murders, juries “on occasion took the law into their own 
hands”22 and refused to convict clearly guilty defendants who, in 
the jury’s view, did not deserve to be executed.23  
                                                                                                     
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 
(1972); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *201. 
 17. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 38–39). 
 18. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976); BANNER, supra 
note 15, at 54. 
 19. See generally Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289; McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198–99; 
Robert E. Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1099, 1102 (1953). 
 20. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198 (quoting Pa. Laws 1794, ch. 1777); Edwin R. 
Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. 
L. REV. 759 (1949); Philip English Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital 
Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U. L. REV. 32 (1974). 
 21. See, e.g., McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198 (“[Pennsylvania’s] reform was soon 
copied by Virginia and thereafter by many other states.”); Herbert Wechsler & 
Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 707–
09 (1937) (discussing statutory reforms in the United States). 
 22. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971).  
 23. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289–90 (1976) (examining the “not 
infrequent refusal of juries to convict murderers”); McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198 
(describing that history as a “rebellion” against mandatory capital sentences); 
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the nineteenth century movement against the death penalty was 
impelled in part by the “practical consideration that jurors were reluctant to bring 
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Conceding defeat, the federal government and the states’ next 
response was to grant juries complete discretion whether to impose 
the death penalty in murder cases.24 By 1963, discretionary capital 
sentencing in murder cases was universal.25 Some groups, such as 
the American Law Institute (ALI), recommended that juries be 
given standards to guide their discretion,26 but standardless 
discretion remained the typical sentencing format in capital cases. 
In fact, in 1971 in McGautha v. California,27 the Supreme Court of 
the United States expressly rejected a due process challenge to 
standardless jury sentencing.28 The Court concluded that, given 
the countless factors potentially relevant in the myriad of cases, 
any guidance would end up being “either meaningless ‘boiler-plate’ 
or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need.”29 The Court 
                                                                                                     
in verdicts which inevitably called for its infliction”). 
 24. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291 (1976) (noting 
that Tennessee was the first state to do so in 1838); Winston v. United States, 172 
U.S. 303, 313 (1899) (ruling that a federal law had “committed the whole matter” 
of the death penalty’s “exercise to the judgment and conscience of the jury”). 
 25. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291–92. 
 26. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962) (enumerating aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances that capital sentencing juries should consider). 
 27. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh’g granted and judgment vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972). 
 28. See id. at 207 (finding “it quite impossible to say that committing to the 
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital 
cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution”). 
 29. Id. at 208. The Court went on to criticize such guidance in depth:  
It is apparent that such criteria do not purport to provide more than 
the most minimal control over the sentencing authority’s exercise of 
discretion. They do not purport to give an exhaustive list of the relevant 
considerations or the way in which they may be affected by the 
presence or absence of other circumstances. They do not even 
undertake to exclude constitutionally impermissible considerations. 
And, of course, they provide no protection against the jury determined 
to decide on whimsy or caprice. In short, they do no more than suggest 
some subjects for the jury to consider during its deliberations, and they 
bear witness to the intractable nature of the problem of ‘standards’ 
which the history of capital punishment has from the beginning 
reflected. Thus, they indeed caution against this Court’s undertaking 
to establish such standards itself, or to pronounce at large that 
standards in this realm are constitutionally required. In light of 
history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, 
we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled 
discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital 
cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. The States are 
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also saw no need to mandate a two-stage trial process so that a 
defendant who declined to testify at trial could plead for his life at 
a separate proceeding devoted to sentencing.30 
All that changed only one year later. Relying now on the 
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,31 the 
Supreme Court did a complete about-face in Furman v. Georgia.32 
By a five-to-four vote, the Court in Furman held unconstitutional 
the identical discretionary sentencing laws that it had sustained 
in McGautha.33 Two members of the Court—Justices William 
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall—concluded that the death 
penalty could never serve as the punishment for any crime, 
                                                                                                     
entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome 
responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due 
regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety 
of factors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence or 
by the arguments of defense counsel. For a court to attempt to catalog 
the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than 
expand the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would 
ever be really complete. 
Id. 207–08 (footnotes omitted).  
 30. Id. at 210–20. 
 31. The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 32. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Nothing in the Court’s prior capital punishment 
decisions gave any hint that the death penalty might violate the Eighth 
Amendment. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971) (“[W]e 
find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of 
the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to 
anything in the [C]onstitution.”); id. at 226 (Black, J., concurring) (“The Eighth 
Amendment forbids ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ In my view, these words 
cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common 
use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors 
came at the time the Amendment was adopted.”); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (holding that carrying out a second attempt at 
execution after first attempt was unsuccessful was not unconstitutional); In re 
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding electrocution as a permissible method 
of execution); id. at 447 (“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a 
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of 
that word as used in the [C]onstitution. It implies there something inhuman and 
barbarous[,] something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”); Wilkerson 
v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134–35 (1878) (“Cruel and unusual punishments are 
forbidden by the Constitution, but . . . the punishment of shooting as a mode of 
executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not 
included in that category, within the meaning of the [E]ighth [A]mendment.”). 
 33. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. 
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regardless of the procedures used at sentencing.34 Justice William 
Douglas found that discretionary sentencing schemes were 
“pregnant with discrimination,” but he reserved judgment about 
mandatory death penalties.35 Justices Potter Stewart and Byron 
White concurred in the judgment on narrower grounds. Justice 
Stewart, because purely discretionary sentencing schemes had led 
to arbitrariness;36 Justice White, because the death penalty had 
been imposed so infrequently that it no longer made any 
measurable contribution to a legitimate purpose of punishment.37 
Four members of the Court—Chief Justice Warren Burger and 
Justices Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist, and Harry Blackmun—
concluded that the death penalty was a constitutionally valid 
punishment and that juries could be given discretion to decide 
whom to condemn and whom to spare, as the Court had decided in 
McGautha.38 
                                                                                                     
 34. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (“Death is an 
unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probability that it 
is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total; and 
there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than 
the less severe punishment of imprisonment.”); id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., 
concurring in judgment) (“[T]he death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary 
punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 35. See id. at 257–58 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment) (“Such 
conceivably might be the fate of a mandatory death penalty, where equal or lesser 
sentences were imposed on the elite, a harsher one on the minorities or members 
of the lower castes. Whether a mandatory death penalty would otherwise be 
constitutional is a question I do not reach.”) (citation omitted). 
 36. See id. at 309–10 (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the 
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”).  
 37. See id. at 313 (“[A]s the statutes before us are now administered, the 
penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated 
to be of substantial service to criminal justice.”).  
 38. Id. at 375–82 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems fair to ask what 
factors have changed that capital punishment should now be ‘cruel’ in the 
constitutional sense as it has not been in the past.”); id. at 405–11 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that, despite his “distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, 
abhorrence, for the death penalty” the decision “should not be taken over by the 
judiciary in the modern guise of an Eighth Amendment issue”); id. at 421–65 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“It is important to keep in focus the enormity of the step 
undertaken by the court today. Not only does it invalidate hundreds of state and 
federal laws, it deprives those jurisdictions of the power to legislate with respect 
to capital punishment in the future . . . .”); id. at 465–70 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court’s judgments today strike down a penalty that our Nation’s 
legislators have thought necessary since our country was founded.”). 
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The federal and state governments believed that capital 
punishment remained a worthwhile and permissible sanction as 
long as the jury’s discretion was guided or eliminated.39 Trying yet 
again, Congress and state legislatures each chose one of two 
different responses.40 One approach was to adopt discretionary 
sentencing schemes like the one recommended by the ALI.41 
Georgia, for example, went that route and adopted a two-stage 
process, with a separate sentencing phase at which the judge 
would offer the jury guidance in making its life-or-death decision.42 
The other approach was to return to mandatory capital 
sentencing—North Carolina and some other states followed that 
path.43 Either approach—Congress and state legislatures 
believed—would avoid the risk of arbitrariness that had troubled 
Justices Stewart and White.44 That was important because adding 
either justice’s vote to the four Furman dissenters would create a 
majority to sustain capital punishment.  
Four years later, the Court revisited this issue in Gregg v. 
Georgia45 and rejected the claim that the death penalty was 
invariably a “cruel and unusual punishment” forbidden by the 
Eighth Amendment.46 Gregg upheld the State’s new 
guided-discretion capital sentencing procedure, based on the ALI’s 
proposed model sentencing law—the same approach that the Court 
had labeled “meaningless ‘boiler-plate’” in McGautha.47 By 
                                                                                                     
 39. Jeffrey T. Heintz, Legislative Response to Furman v. Georgia—Ohio 
Restores the Death Penalty, 8 AKRON L. REV. 149, 154 (1974) (“Predictably, the 
state legislatures began expressing the intention to reinstitute the death penalty 
soon after the Furman decision was announced.”).  
 40. See id. (stating that legislatures had a choice between instituting a 
mandatory death penalty for certain offenses or creating “workable standards”). 
 41. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962) (identifying aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances relevant to a jury’s capital sentencing decision). 
 42. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 160–68 (1976) (describing Georgia’s 
new sentencing procedures). 
 43. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976) (discussing 
North Carolina’s mandatory capital sentencing law). 
 44. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 167 (explaining how Georgia’s sentencing 
procedures specifically included tests to guard against arbitrariness).  
 45. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 46. Id. at 168–87. 
 47. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971), reh’g granted and 
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 
(1972). 
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contrast, in a companion case to Gregg, Woodson v. North 
Carolina,48 the Court ruled that a mandatory death penalty was 
now not just an unsatisfactory way to deal with capital crimes, but 
also an unconstitutional approach, rejected by years of experience 
with juries.49 Gregg brought to a close the decade-long period in 
which a small number of lawyers working at the NAACP Legal 
Defense & Educational Fund had effectively persuaded the federal 
courts to impose a moratorium on the use of capital punishment 
while their nationwide campaign to have the death penalty 
declared unconstitutional wended its way through the courts.50 
                                                                                                     
 48. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 49. See id. at 285–305 (“[O]ne of the most significant developments in our 
society’s treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection of the common-
law practice of inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every person convicted 
of a specified offense.”). 
 50. For an insider’s account of that effort, see generally MICHAEL MELTSNER, 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973). 
There were second-, third-, and fourth-order claims that could still be litigated 
after Gregg, such as the following: (1) the death penalty discriminated against 
black defendants (because they were sentenced to death at a disproportionately 
high rate) or members of the black community (because murderers of black 
victims were sentenced to death at a disproportionately low rate); (2) the “death 
qualification” of jurors—that is, the exclusion at the guilt stage of jurors who 
would not consider imposing the death penalty at the sentencing stage—violated 
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury taken from a “fair cross-section” 
of the community; (3) individual capital sentencing schemes were 
unconstitutional under Gregg; (4) executing some categories of defendants—for 
example, the mentally incompetent, juveniles—was unconstitutional; and (5) old 
criminal procedure doctrines, such as the permissible use of an “Allen charge,” a 
supplemental jury instruction telling a potentially deadlocked panel to continue 
deliberating to reach a verdict, see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), 
should be reconsidered and forbidden in capital cases. Over time, the Supreme 
Court accepted some of those claims and rejected the others. See, e.g., Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (ruling that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause prohibits the execution of an offender who was a juvenile at 
the time of the crime); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (same, a 
mentally retarded offender); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988) 
(rejecting challenge to use of an Allen charge in a capital case); Sumner v. 
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987) (ruling that a mandatory sentence of death cannot 
be imposed on a prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319–20 (1987) (rejecting 
claims of discriminatory application of the death penalty); Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 399, 416–18 (1986) (ruling that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause prohibits the execution of an offender incompetent at the time of his 
execution even if he was found competent to stand trial and sane at the time of 
the crime); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986) (rejecting the argument 
that the dismissal at the guilt stage of jurors who would not consider the death 
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B. Post-Gregg Criticisms of the Clemency Process in Capital Cases  
Following Gregg, there was not only a material increase in the 
number of offenders sentenced to death, but also an even greater 
decline in the number of offenders whose death sentences were 
commuted.51 That was a new development. Until 1976, governors 
had commuted capital sentences with some degree of frequency 
throughout the twentieth century.52 The post-Gregg decrease in 
                                                                                                     
penalty violates the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Clause); Roberts v. Louisiana, 
431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977) (ruling that a mandatory sentence of death cannot be 
imposed on an offender for the first-degree murder of a police officer). 
 51. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Rethinking the Timing of Capital 
Clemency, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (describing how, excluding mass 
commutations, governors and pardon boards commuted only sixty-six death 
sentences from 1976–2013); Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical 
Analysis of Clemency and Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 241 (2003) [hereinafter 
Heise, Numbers] (explaining that, despite an increase in the number of death 
sentences, there has been “a decrease in the number of defendants removed from 
death row through clemency”); Mary-Beth Moylan & Linda E. Carter, Clemency 
in California Capital Cases, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 37, 45–46 (2009) (tracking 
the decrease in commutations in California); William Alex Pridemore, An 
Empirical Examination of Commutations and Executions in Post-Furman Capital 
Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 159, 161 fig.1 (2000) (charting the number of executions 
compared to commutations); Sarat & Hussain, supra note 2, at 1310 (noting the 
“dramatic shift” during the 1990s in the diminishing number of inmates granted 
clemency). 
 52. Different commentators have offered different statistics or calculations. 
One has said that, from 1900 to 1968, there were more than 700 commutations, 
but from 1976 to 2013, aside from mass commutations that cleared out death row, 
governors commuted the death sentences of only sixty-six people, many of which 
occurred when a governor was leaving office. Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 6, 50. 
Another commentator calculated that, from 1960 to 1970, the ratio of executions 
to commutations was 5:4, while from 1976 to 1996 the ratio decreased to 5:1. 
Korengold et al., supra note 3, at 357; see also BANNER, supra note 15, at 291 (“For 
centuries governors commuted death sentences in significant numbers. That 
pattern continued for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century. Florida 
commuted nearly a quarter of its death sentences between 1924 and 1966. North 
Carolina commuted more than a third between 1909 and 1954.”); JULIUS GOEBEL, 
JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIA NEW YORK 227 n.17, 
757–59 (1970) (“In general, the pardon power seems to have been exercised not 
ungenerously . . . .”); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 5, at 186 (showing the number of 
pardons by president); Bedau, supra note 2, at 262–66 & tbls.1 & 2 (analyzing the 
number of death sentences and commutations from 1960–1988 and 1900–1985). 
For a discussion of the standards used and reasons given by governors, see id. at 
260–61 (identifying nine specific reasons); David Paget, Note, Executive Clemency 
in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 159–77 (1964) (examining various 
standards governors have applied to reach their decision). 
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the number of commutations, coupled with an increase in juries’ 
decisions to impose the death penalty, meant that a greater 
number of condemned prisoners faced the prospect of crossing the 
River Styx. 
Some commentators have bemoaned the drop-off in the 
number of commutations in capital cases.53 Some critics have 
argued that the decline is troublesome in its own right, but capital 
punishment opponents go further, claiming that the figures 
disguise a deeper problem: namely, that governors have 
abandoned their responsibility to ensure that justice is done in 
each condemned prisoner’s case.54 Fearing the electorate’s political 
wrath, governors have refused to commute death sentences, 
particularly in election years.55 In fact, the argument goes, some 
governors have allowed prisoners to be executed even though their 
trials were marred by fundamental irregularities, their cases cried 
out for leniency, or there was a serious doubt as to their guilt.56 
                                                                                                     
 53. See generally supra note 3; cf. Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 6, 54–55 
(criticizing the practice of delaying clemency consideration until after a prisoner 
has exhausted all avenues of judicial relief). 
 54. See, e.g., Korengold et al., supra note 3, at 350 (“The decline in clemency 
grants arguably reflects an abdication by state executives of their traditional role 
in the capital system.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Laura M. Argys & H. Naci Mocan, Who Shall Live and Who 
Shall Die? An Analysis of Prisoners on Death Row in the United States, 33 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 255, 280 (2004) (“We find that if an inmate’s stay on death row ends 
at a point in time where the governor is a lame duck, the probability of 
commutation increases significantly.”); Burnett, supra note 6, at 198, 200 
(naming specific instances of political backlash to grants of clemency); 
Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 4 (“In large part, the decline of clemency can be 
attributed to tough-on-crime politics.”); Jeffrey D. Kubik & John R. Moran, Lethal 
Elections: Gubernatorial Politics and the Timing of Elections, 46 J.L. & ECON. 1, 
3 (2003) (“We find that the occurrence of a gubernatorial election increases the 
probability of state execution by approximately 25 percent.”); Pridemore, supra 
note 51, at 172, 176, 180 (concluding in a post-Gregg study that governors are less 
likely to commute death sentences in election years than in off years). Governors 
themselves have admitted that political considerations entered into their 
clemency decisions. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 7, at iii, 90–115 (explaining the 
decision to commute the sentence of Edward Wein, who afterward raped and 
murdered a woman). But see Heise, Numbers, supra note 51, at 292–93 
(concluding that there is no significant variation in cases where a governor is 
retiring from office). 
 56. See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 6, at 200 (“Prisoners have been executed in 
cases where appeals were still pending, where their attorneys missed filing issues 
or filed a brief over the page limit, and where significant, new or withheld 
evidence was yet to be evaluated by any trier of fact.”); Daniel T. Kobil, How to 
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There is more. Because the clemency power has long been 
deemed a prerogative of presidents and governors,57 they have 
defined their decision-making procedures largely on their own 
without any legislative or judicial oversight.58 The result is that, 
                                                                                                     
Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 219–20 (2003) 
(describing George W. Bush’s denial of Karla Faye Tucker’s request for clemency 
despite widespread support); Silverman, supra note 3, at 394, 398 (arguing the 
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles’ refusal to hear “Gary Graham’s facially 
convincing claim of innocence” is an example of how Texas has “in practice” 
abolished clemency). 
 57. Prior to 1998, the Supreme Court had consistently ruled that, because 
the clemency power was a prerogative of the chief executive, the Constitution did 
not regulate its exercise. See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 414 
(1983); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Schick v. Reed, 
419 U.S. 256 (1974); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), abrogated on other 
grounds by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307 
(1856). In 1998, however, the Court created uncertainty in this regard by issuing 
a fractured opinion in Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998). 
The question in Woodard was whether the old rule directing the courts to 
maintain a “hands off” posture toward clemency still applied to condemned 
prisoners despite the development of new procedural rights for convicted 
offenders. Id. at 276. A plurality of four justices concluded that a condemned 
prisoner has no right at clemency proceedings that is protected by the Due Process 
Clause. Id. at 275, 279–85 (plurality opinion). But five justices concluded that 
condemned offenders are entitled to minimal due process protections. Id. at 288–
89 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 291–95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Because one of those five justices (Justice John Paul Stevens) was in dissent, 
however, there was no majority opinion on this issue. So far, the lower federal 
courts have rejected post-Woodard attempts to regulate clemency proceedings 
under the Due Process Clause as long as the governor does not use a decision-
making process entirely devoid of any reason, such as flipping a coin to see who 
should receive clemency. See generally Gissendaner v. Comm’r, Georgia Dep’t of 
Corr., 794 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015); Winfield v. Steele, 755 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 
2014) (en banc); Wellons v. Comm’r, Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1268, 1269 
(11th Cir. 2014); Anderson v. Davis, 279 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2002); Parker v. State 
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2001); Workman v. Bell, 245 
F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2001); Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1998); Davis 
v. Scott, No. 8:14-CV-01676-T-27TBM, 2014 WL 3407473, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 
10, 2014); Schad v. Brewer, No. CV-13-01962-PHX-ROS, 2013 WL 5551668 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 4, 2013) aff’d, 732 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2013); Workman v. Summers, 136 
F. Supp. 2d 896 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) aff’d, 8 F. App’x 371 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 58. See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280–81 
(1998) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he heart of executive clemency . . . is to grant 
clemency as a matter of grace, thus allowing the executive to consider a wide 
range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing 
determinations.”); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) 
(“[P]ardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of 
courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”); 
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (“A fair reading of the history . . . of the 
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critics say, governors have often used procedures that are so 
manifestly unfair that they would be held unconstitutional if all 
that were at stake were the denial of public welfare benefits.59 Add 
in the fact that there is no consensus on the standards that 
governors should use when making clemency decisions,60 and you 
get a large number of cases in which it is impossible to explain why 
clemency was granted or denied. Some argue that the result, 
viewed at a nationwide level, is the same type of arbitrariness that 
the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Furman.61 
                                                                                                     
language of that clause itself, and of the unbroken practice since 1790 compels 
the conclusion that the power flows from the Constitution alone . . . and that it 
cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress.”); Solesbee v. 
Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950) (“Power of executive clemency . . . has 
traditionally rested in governors or the President, although some of that power is 
often delegated to agencies such as pardon or parole boards. Seldom, if ever, has 
this power of executive clemency been subjected to review by the courts.”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); United 
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871) (“To the executive alone is intrusted [sic] 
the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that due process 
requires notice and an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing before a neutral 
decisionmaker in order for the state to terminate welfare benefits); Deborah 
Leavy, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital 
Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 910 (1981) (“The Supreme Court has set 
high procedural standards to reduce the risk of informational error and provide 
individualized sentencing in death penalty cases. Yet the effect . . . is negated 
when the lack of procedural protection reintroduces those risks at the clemency 
stage.”). For a detailed description of state clemency laws and processes, see 
Paget, supra note 52, at 141–77. 
 60. See Daniel T. Kobil, Chance and the Constitution in Capital Clemency 
Cases, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 567, 567 (2000) (describing clemency as a “largely 
unprincipled, almost standardless component in our justice system”).  
 61. See id. (claiming clemency “has been exercised in an arbitrary fashion” 
but also arguing that it has been underutilized). One remedy that critics propose 
is to impose on governors the same procedural safeguards seen as a necessary 
ingredient of the trial process in capital and non-capital cases alike, such as an 
adversary proceeding at which the condemned prisoner is represented by 
state-appointed counsel. Some commentators have even gone further and urged 
states to create independent clemency boards staffed by career officials to prevent 
politics from entering into clemency decisions. See Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in 
Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Clemency, 27 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 201, 225 (1993) (“[C]onsiderations of fairness require that the 
hearing should take place before an unbiased decision-maker.”); Silverman, supra 
note 3, at 395–97 (outlining the procedure a hearing before an independent 
clemency board would follow); Leavy, supra note 59, at 907 (calling for the use of 
capital sentencing safeguards at clemency proceedings).  
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Interestingly, one factor does not appear to play a role in 
clemency decisions, a factor that has haunted the American 
criminal justice system since Virginia was a colony: race.62 Several 
studies of post-Gregg executions over different periods since 1976 
have concluded either that race was not a factor in governors’ 
decisions whether to commute a death sentence or that condemned 
black prisoners are more likely than white death row inmates to 
receive clemency.63  
By contrast, those studies found that men are more likely than 
women to be sentenced to death and executed.64 On its face, that 
fact is not surprising, because men—particularly young men— 
commit more crimes, including more violent crimes, than women.65 
In any event, that disparity does not by itself establish the 
invidious discrimination necessary to establish an equal protection 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 22 (“[R]ace . . . has played a 
comparatively minor role in successful commutations during the modern era.”). 
 63. See Argys & Mocan, supra note 55, at 272 tbl.2 (2004) (comparing 
commutation rates among blacks, Hispanics, and other races); id. (noting that 
with the exception of a condemned prisoner who received clemency because he 
was black, race did not appear to play a role in clemency decisions); Matthew C. 
Heise, The Geography of Mercy: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency for Death Row 
Inmates, 39 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 3, 17 (2013) [hereinafter Heise, Geography] 
(“[C]lemency rates for black and white defendants do not appear to differ, at least 
at statistical levels.”); Heise, Numbers, supra note 51, at 281–84 (concluding that 
there is no evidence that “racial or ethnic minorities on death row were any less 
successful in obtaining clemency than their non-minority counterparts” which 
“comports with prior empirical studies of clemency yet conflicts with widely-held 
perceptions about the general influence of race in the death penalty context”); 
Heise, Unequal Grace, supra note 2, at 973–75, 985 (“[W]hen it comes to clemency 
decisions, any systemic racial tilt favors African-Americans.”); Pridemore, supra 
note 51, at 175, 180 (“Neither the presence of at least one prior felony conviction 
nor the offender’s race seems to play a role in the final disposition.”); John 
Kraemer, Note, An Empirical Examination of the Factors Associated with the 
Commutation of State Death Row Prisoners’ Sentences Between 1986 and 2005, 
45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1410 (2008) (“Prisoners of black, Hispanic, or other 
racial/ethnic heritage have slightly over twice the odds of commutation (OR=2.01) 
compared to their white counterparts after removing the effect of other factors. 
This association is highly unlikely to have been caused by chance (p=0.004).”).  
 64. Argys & Mocan, supra note 55, at 272 tbl.2; Heise, Geography, supra note 
63, at 971–73, 985; Heise, Numbers, supra note 51, at 275–76 & tbl.5; Kraemer, 
supra note 63, at 1408–10; Pridemore, supra note 51, at 176, 180.  
 65. MELISSA S. KEARNEY ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, BROOKINGS, TEN 
ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICY 
MEMO 6 (May 2014); Heise, Unequal Grace, supra note 2, at 971; John Monahan, 
A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, 
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 432 (2006).  
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violation.66 Men are more likely than women to commit predatory, 
brutal, or horrific crimes.67 Women who kill principally commit 
crimes of passion within the domestic environment, perhaps 
because they have been the victims of domestic violence.68 In 
addition, the criminal justice system has not unfairly targeted men 
for disparate treatment based on statistically and morally 
unjustified stereotypical views about their sex.69 Under those 
circumstances, the correlation some commentators have found 
would not establish an equal protection violation. 
* * * * * 
The next step is to determine whether those criticisms are 
persuasive. It turns out that they are either unconvincing or 
overstated. Indeed, parties seeking the abolition of capital 
punishment do not give themselves sufficient credit for the 
sizeable amount of progress they have made in that campaign.70 
The sentencing stage of capital prosecutions now eliminates 
almost all of the people who would have received clemency in days 
gone by.71 The small number of commutations seen today is a 
testament to that success and is an entirely logical result of the 
                                                                                                     
 66. See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976).  
 67. KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 65, at 6. 
 68. Heise, Numbers, supra note 51, at 274–78; Kraemer, supra note 63, at 
1409; Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-
Conviction Relief and a Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 43, 43 (1998). But see Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 507 (1995) 
(detailing how a woman arranged the contract killing of her husband so that she 
could continue an affair). 
 69. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Managing Prisons by the Numbers: Using the 
Good-Time Laws and Risk-Needs Assessments to Manage the Federal Prison 
Population, 1 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 19 (2014) (“The evidence justifies 
treating men differently from women.”). 
 70. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2016), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 
2016) (tracking the decrease in executions over the last ten years) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 71. See infra notes 151–156 and accompanying text (describing how the 
criminal justice system now considers those mitigating factors that used to be 
considered only for the purposes of clemency). 
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new capital sentencing rules adopted by the Supreme Court over 
the last forty years.72  
III. Capital Punishment, Clemency, and Innocence 
Critics of today’s clemency practices will argue that governors 
have failed to ensure that no innocent person is executed.73 
According to those critics, given the horrific facts of some capital 
cases, there is a unique risk that innocent defendants will be 
convicted and executed in capital cases because the public will 
demand that someone pay for those crimes.74 That risk has always 
existed,75 critics say, but the proof is now far more persuasive. 
Relying on the work of the Innocence Project as well as opinions by 
Supreme Court Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer, capital 
punishment opponents will contend that their claim is now 
supported by credible scientific proof that the death penalty poses 
an unacceptable likelihood of executing an innocent man.76 
Executive clemency will not stop this event from happening, 
according to death penalty opponents, because governors, fearing 
the wrath of angry voters—especially at the cusp of an election—
                                                                                                     
 72. See infra text accompanying notes 146–150 (noting the various 
situations where capital punishment is off the table). 
 73. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of 
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 92 (1987) (describing the 
execution of Everett Applegate, a man denied clemency despite the governor’s 
doubts regarding his guilt). 
 74. See, e.g., Frady, supra note 6, at 105 (characterizing the execution of 
Rickey Rector as “a test in Arkansas of the lengths to which a society would 
pursue the old urge to expiate one killing by performing another”). 
 75. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 73, at 72–75 (collecting early studies 
alleging the execution of innocent parties). See generally BANNER, supra note 15, 
at 121–22, 303–05; FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE (2008); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2012); BARRY SCHECK, 
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 
(2003). 
 76. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756–57 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (detailing cases where allegedly innocent people have been executed); 
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 208–10 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (exploring 
cases where innocent individuals might have been executed without a death 
penalty moratorium). 
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will refuse to grant clemency to condemned prisoners regardless of 
their innocence whenever the public demands blood.77 
 That criticism is more often leveled against the institution of 
capital punishment itself rather than advanced as a fault in the 
clemency process.78 Moreover, the argument is as much designed 
to undermine the resolve of death penalty supporters and scare 
them into changing sides in the debate—or at least remaining 
neutral—as it is used to persuade courts that the clemency process 
is flawed. And that argument has the potential to silence capital 
punishment’s supporters. It is, in fact, the most potent argument 
that abolitionists can advance and could persuade a large number 
of people. The execution-of-the-innocent claim forces people to 
confront the greatest potential miscarriage of justice facing the 
system. The assumptions are that no one wants to see an innocent 
person executed and that few people are willing to support a 
penalty carrying that risk whatever its other benefits may be.79 At 
least, that is what abolitionists believe. 
It would be possible to side step this issue in an article 
discussing the clemency process. The reason would be that the 
question of whether the institution of capital punishment poses a 
risk of executing an innocent defendant is materially different 
from the question of whether the institution of executive clemency 
adequately serves as the last line of protection for the innocent. 
Clemency could be perfectly capable of protecting the vast number 
of innocent parties who have not already been identified in the 
judicial process even if there were a unique conviction-of-
the-innocent risk in capital cases. Of course, the clemency process 
might be incapable of performing that function perfectly. No 
criminal justice system could pass that test, however,80 so we 
should not demand perfection where it is not attainable. After all, 
we demand only that the jury find a defendant guilty beyond a 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Burnett, supra note 6, at 205 (“The circumstantial evidence of 
political influence leads me to convict the clemency process of failure to ensure 
justice.”). 
 78. See id. at 205 (“‘Executions . . . [are] about justice not politics.”).  
 79. See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 3, at 377 (“It seems obvious beyond 
explanation that it is wrong—in a moral and a legal sense—to put an innocent 
person to death.”). 
 80. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (“It is an unalterable fact 
that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible.”). 
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“reasonable doubt,” not “any doubt.”81 Perfection, therefore, should 
not be the standard. In any event, the question of whether 
executive clemency can satisfactorily perform a goalkeeping 
function should be analyzed separately from the question whether 
capital punishment poses a unique risk of convicting the innocent.  
That approach, however, is ultimately unsatisfactory because 
it just kicks the can down the road. Whether the criminal justice 
system will mistakenly execute an innocent party is hardly a new 
problem. That risk has been around as long as the death penalty 
has been a sentencing option. Executive clemency has promised to 
function as the “fail safe” in the criminal justice system as long as 
the death penalty has been an available punishment, which means 
as long as the criminal justice system has been in operation.82 If 
that risk is not a significant one, there is little reason to believe 
that executive clemency cannot identify the few cases where an 
innocent person remains on death row after exhausting all of his 
legal challenges to his conviction and sentence. Accordingly, it 
makes sense to examine the execution-of-the-innocent risk in 
federal and state cases to determine if executive clemency is an 
adequate “fail safe.” 
Start with the federal cases. The Justice Department will not 
bring a capital case unless the Attorney General personally 
approves it after review by the Capital Case Section of the 
Criminal Division and the Attorney General’s Review Committee 
on Capital Cases.83 The federal government has executed only 
                                                                                                     
 81. See also, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 18–21 (1993) (upholding the 
use of a jury instruction that defined reasonable doubt as “actual and substantial 
doubt”); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398 (“A person when first charged with a crime is 
entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his guilt be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 386 (1970) 
(ruling that the reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally required).  
 82. See supra note 8 (exploring the long history of the death penalty and 
clemency from case law, the Bible, and narrative works). 
 83. CAPITAL CASE SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice. 
gov/criminal/capital-case-section (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Trial and post-trial procedures are more 
favorable to the defense in capital than noncapital cases. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3005 (2012) (requiring the appointment of two defense lawyers in every capital 
case, one of whom must be “learned in the law applicable to capital cases”); id. 
§ 3592 (listing aggravating and mitigating factors for the jury to consider); id. 
§ 3593 (requiring a hearing before the judge or jury on the appropriateness of the 
death penalty); id. § 3595 (requiring appellate review in every case where a 
prisoner was sentenced to death); id. § 3599 (providing counsel for indigent 
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three offenders over the last fifty years, the best known one being 
Timothy McVeigh, who was responsible for the Oklahoma City 
bombing that killed 168 people and injured hundreds of others.84 
No one claims that McVeigh, or the other two executed offenders, 
were innocent. Atop that, since the attacks on this nation on 9/11, 
the federal government has carried out various operations in 
foreign countries to kill parties like Osama Bin Laden85 who were 
responsible for the nearly three thousand murders that occurred 
at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania. No one claims that Bin Laden or the other terrorists 
were innocent. The execution-of-the-innocent claim therefore does 
not have much valence with regard to the federal government. 
Turn to the state cases. Even there, the underlying risk of 
executing an innocent party is insubstantial. There is no logical 
reason to distinguish between capital and non-capital cases 
regarding the risk of convicting an innocent man.86 Most capital 
cases involve a murder.87 The same law enforcement officers 
(ordinarily detectives), forensic examiners, prosecutors, judges, 
and juries will be used in all homicide cases, whether or not the 
government charges the defendant with capital murder and 
                                                                                                     
prisoners for post-conviction proceedings in capital cases); id. § 3600 (offering 
DNA testing); see also Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376–78 (1999) 
(describing the operation of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3591–3599 (2012)).  
 84. See generally United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1999). 
The other two are Juan Raul Garza and Louis Jones, Jr.; Jones v. United States, 
527 U.S. 373 (1999); United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995); FACTS 
ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY supra note 70. 
 85. See Helene Cooper, Obama Announces Killing of Osama bin Laden, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 1, 2011, 11:29 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/bin-
laden-dead-u-s-official-says/?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) (reporting that the 
death of Osama bin Laden came as a result of a “‘targeted assault’” by U.S. 
operatives) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 86. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t is convictions, not punishments, that are unreliable.”).  
 87. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114, 1116, 1118–1121 (2012) (murder of 
different parties or by a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment); id. § 3591(a)(2) 
(authorizing death penalty for intentional homicide); 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2012) 
(requiring proof of intent to kill in a drug case). In fact, there is some question 
whether the death penalty is a constitutionally permissible sanction for any other 
crime. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (ruling that the death 
penalty cannot be imposed for the crime of the rape of an adult woman); Kennedy 
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (same, for a minor), opinion modified, 554 U.S. 
945 (2008). 
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whether or not the jury later returns a capital sentence. Moreover, 
there are various procedural safeguards used only in capital cases 
that minimize the risk that an innocent defendant will be convicted 
and sentenced to death.88 Courts are also far more likely to 
critically examine the proof against an offender facing the gallows, 
rather than imprisonment, regardless of the term imposed.89 
Finally, journalists in the national media seeking a Pulitzer Prize 
would be hot on the trail of any condemned prisoner with any 
remotely plausible claim of innocence.90 In sum, it is unlikely that 
the state governments will execute an innocent party.  
Now look at this issue from a legislative perspective. Congress 
and state assemblies may legitimately balance the risk of 
executing an innocent offender against the risk that abolishing 
capital punishment will lead to the murder of innocent parties.91 
After all, elected officials regularly make numerous decisions that 
have life or death consequences;92 whether to use capital 
punishment is just one of them. As Professor Ron Allen and Amy 
Shavell have explained: 
Although it seems to have escaped the attention of the death 
penalty debate, a common feature of social planning is that it 
affects the incidence of death. Virtually all social policies and 
decisions quite literally determine who will live and who will 
                                                                                                     
 88. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A 
Response to the Bedau–Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 147–54 (1988) 
(discussing state procedures).  
 89. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Researchers have 
calculated that courts (or State Governors) are 130 times more likely to exonerate 
where a capital murder, rather than a noncapital murder, is at issue.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Chronicle’s Falkenberg Wins Pulitzer for Commentary, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-
texas/article/Chronicle-s-Falkenberg-wins-Pulitzer-for-6211676.php (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2016) (describing how columnist Lisa Falkenberg’s reporting on the 
innocence of a man on death row for ten years won her the Pulitzer Prize and led 
to his release) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 91. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the 
Guillotine, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625 (2005); Markman & Cassell, supra 
note 88, at 145–160; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment 
Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 
(2005) [hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, Life-Life Tradeoffs]; Cass R. Sunstein 
& Adrian Vermeule, Deterring Murder: A Reply, 58 STAN. L. REV. 847, 853 (2005) 
[hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, Reply].  
 92. See Allen & Shavell, supra note 91, at 628 (using the example of 
regulating road safety). 
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die. Every year for half a century, between 25,000 and 40,000 
people have died in vehicular accidents, many of whom are 
innocent in every sense of the word. The number of deaths on 
the roads is clearly quite sensitive to current regulation; faster 
speed limits mean more deaths, safety devices on cars affect the 
outcome of crashes, and so on. Merely permitting people on the 
roads guarantees a slaughter, and the mere fact of innocent 
deaths is not sufficient to put an end to the slaughter. But, is 
that not because of the benefits that result? Maybe so, but that, 
actually, is our point: explicit tradeoffs are made between 
benefits and costs, including the costs of innocent deaths.93  
Consider a recent example of that tradeoff: the adoption of 
medical or recreational marijuana initiatives. Federal and state 
laws have outlawed the possession and distribution of marijuana 
since the 1930s.94 Recently, however, numerous states have 
modified their criminal codes by adopting so-called “medical 
marijuana programs”—viz., laws that permit marijuana to be used 
for medical purposes.95 A few states and the District of Columbia 
have also decriminalized the possession of small quantities of 
marijuana for personal use.96 Supporters of those initiatives argue 
                                                                                                     
 93. Id. at 628 (footnote omitted).  
 94. See generally RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITBREAD II, THE 
MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 38–52 (1999). 
 95. See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-12-214.2 (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. 
§§ 17.37.010–17.37.080 (West 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2801 to 36-2819 
(2014); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.5, 11362.7–11362.83 (West 2014); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1.5-106 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408 
(2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, Ch. 49A (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329-121 
to 329-128 (West 2014); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/1 (West 2014); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2014); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 333.26424(j) (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-301 (2014); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 453A.010 to 453A.240 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 126-X:2 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §24:6I (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31C-1 
(2014); 2014 N.Y. Laws 90 (A.6357-E); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.300 (West 2014); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28.6 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4474b (2014); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.040 (West 2014). See also, e.g., William Vertes & 
Sarah Barbantini, Caught in the Crossfire: The Dilemma of Marijuana 
“Medicalization” for Health Care Providers, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 103, 105 n.17 
(2012) (collecting ballot measures). 
 96. 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 3 (1.M.502) (West) (amending WASH. REV. 
CODE § 69.50.4013 (2014)); AMENDMENT 64: USE AND REGULATION OF MARIJUANA 
(2012) (amending COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)); see also TODD GARVEY & BRIAN 
T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43034, STATE LEGALIZATION OF RECREATIONAL 
MARIJUANA: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1–5 (Jan. 13, 2014) (summarizing the 
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that the benefits from those exemptions outweigh any costs from 
greater use of that drug.97  
A factor that is rarely discussed in that debate, however, is the 
effect of medical or recreational marijuana use on highway 
safety.98 There is little doubt that enacting such programs 
increases the risk of highway morbidity and mortality: the 
National Institute of Medicine, the British Medical Association, 
the World Health Organization, the federal officials in this nation 
responsible for highway safety, and numerous researchers have 
concluded that driving under the influence of marijuana poses a 
serious risk of death or serious injury due to a vehicle crash.99 
Moreover, that risk is aggravated if a person consumes both 
marijuana and alcohol because each drug amplifies the effect of the 
other.100 The result is this: adoption of medical and recreational 
marijuana initiatives poses the risk of killing entirely innocent 
parties, such as other motorists, passengers, or pedestrians.101 
Those people are no less innocent than the hypothetical individual 
who is wrongfully convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to 
death. If we are willing to leave to the public the authority to decide 
whether the perceived benefits of medical or recreational 
marijuana usage outweighs the costs of killing parties innocent of 
a capital crime (any crime, in fact), we ought to be equally willing 
                                                                                                     
Colorado and Washington initiatives); WILLIAM J. BENNETT & ROBERT A. WHITE, 
GOING TO POT: WHY THE RUSH TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA IS HARMING AMERICA 9–10 
(2015) (listing the states that have allowed marijuana for medicinal use). That 
issue is likely to appear on the ballot in additional states in 2016.  
 97. For a discussion of the pros and cons of marijuana regulation, see 
generally BENNETT & WHITE, supra note 96; BONNIE & WHITBREAD II, supra note 
94; JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE 
NEEDS TO KNOW (2d ed. 2016); ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR 
HERESIES (2001); WAYNE HALL, CANNABIS USE AND DEPENDENCE: PUBLIC HEALTH 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (2003); JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION 
(1969); MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA: COSTS OF ABUSE, COSTS OF CONTROl 
(1989); KEVIN A. SABET, REEFER SANITY: SEVEN GREAT MYTHS ABOUT MARIJUANA 
(2013).  
 98. See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Medical or Recreational Marijuana and 
Drugged Driving, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 453 (2015) (discussing this issue at length).  
 99. Id. at 476–78, nn.98–103.  
 100. Id. at 478–79, nn.104–108. 
 101. See id. at 477 (“[S]tudies justify the conclusion that marijuana use is 
associated with an increased risk of motor-vehicle accidents, particularly ones 
involving fatalities, due to its effects on psychomotor performance.”). 
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to allow the public to decide whether the perceived benefits of 
capital punishment outweigh the costs of killing the same type of 
people. 
It is no argument that legislators discount the risk of 
executing an innocent party, or give that factor far less weight than 
the risk of traffic accidents or other potentially fatal occurrences. 
Any legislator who believes that capital punishment serves 
legitimate purposes has an incentive to eliminate any 
execution-of-the-innocent risk because that result would arm 
abolitionists with their most treasured weapon.102 
When we ask whether elected officials have reasonably 
analyzed the execution-of-the-innocent risk, we need to recognize 
that eliminating capital punishment will surely lead to the murder 
of innocent parties. History proves that point. Murderers have 
been released or escaped and committed the same crime again;103 
                                                                                                     
 102. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 15, at 303–05 (discussing the political 
ramifications of executing innocent people). 
 103. See, e.g., Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 418 (1991) (explaining how 
Mu’Min, while on work release, absconded and murdered a woman); Tison v. 
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139–41 (1987) (detailing how, while serving a life sentence 
for murder, Tison, with the aid of his wife and two sons, escaped and murdered a 
family of four—which included a two-year-old—with repeated shotgun blasts); 
Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: 
SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 208 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. 
Cassell eds., 2004) (“In fact, the balance of risk tips decisively in favor of retailing 
the death penalty. . . . If they are not executed, they will remain serious threats 
to kill again—either inside prison walls or outside them following an escape or a 
parole.”); Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1995) (stating “the simple fact is, people 
sentenced to life in prison without parole, or even to a death sentence, do, 
occasionally, get out and do it again” and listing several examples, including 
“Robert Massie, who celebrated the California Supreme Court’s commutation of 
his 1965 murder conviction by murdering again” (footnotes omitted)); Joshua 
Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 518 (2005) 
(noting that “the additional victims of the freed” include “[n]ine, killed by Kenneth 
McDuff, who had been sentenced to die for child murder in Texas and then was 
freed on parole after the death penalty laws at the time were overturned”); Joshua 
K. Marquis, Truth and Consequences: The Penalty of Death, in Bedau & Cassell, 
supra note 103, at 133–34 (noting that Kenneth McDuff, Richard Marquette, Jack 
Henry Abbott, and Robert Lee Massie committed additional murders after being 
paroled); Allen & Shavell, supra note 91, at 631 (“According to the Bureau of 
Justice reports, 6.6% of released murderers in 1983 were arrested for murder 
within three years of their release. Of the state prisoners released in 1994, 1.2% 
of the 4,443 persons (or 53 individuals) who had served time for homicide were 
rearrested for homicide.”); Sewell Chan, Mailer and the Murderer, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 2007, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/mailer-and-the-
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others have committed additional murders while imprisoned.104 
Former U.S. District Court Judge, now Professor, Paul Cassell has 
made that point well: 
Perhaps the most straightforward argument for the death 
penalty is that it saves innocent lives by preventing convicted 
murderers from killing again. . . . Some sense of the risk here is 
conveyed by the fact that of roughly 52,000 state prison inmates 
serving time for murder, an estimated 810 had previously been 
convicted of murder and had killed 821 persons following those 
convictions. Executing each of those inmates after the first 
murder conviction would have saved the lives of more than 800 
persons. . . . In plain words, some innocent people will die if we 
abolish the death penalty.105  
                                                                                                     
murderer/?_r=0 (last visited June 12, 2016) (relating how well-known author 
Norman Mailer helped secure the parole of Jack Henry Abbot, who subsequently 
committed another murder within weeks of his parole) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); supra notes 7 & 55 (discussing the case of 
Edward Wein who was released and committed murder); infra Appendix A 
(listing additional cases). 
 104. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1993) (“Thomas Creech 
has admitted to killing or participating in the killing of at least 26 
people. . . . Creech’s most recent victim was David Dale Jensen, a fellow 
inmate . . . . When he killed Jensen, Creech was already serving life sentences for 
other first-degree murders.”); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67 (1987) (“In 
1958, respondent Raymond Wallace Shuman was convicted . . . of first-degree 
murder . . . [and] was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole . . . . [W]hile serving his life sentence, Shuman was convicted of capital 
murder for the killing of a fellow inmate.” (citations omitted)); State v. Smith, 781 
S.W.2d 761, 769 (Mo. 1989) (while imprisoned for a “second degree murder 
conviction for shooting an eighty-six-year-old woman while defendant was 
attempting to break into her home,” Smith repeatedly stabbed another inmate, 
killing him), judgment vacated and case remanded on other grounds, 495 U.S. 916 
(1990), capital sentence reinstated on remand, 790 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1990); State 
v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Mo. 1982) (noting that while serving a life 
sentence for first degree murder, Bolder murdered another prison inmate); 
Cassell, supra note 103, at 192 (“[T]hose serving a sentence of life without parole 
(often offered as a substitute for capital punishment) have a ‘license to kill’ 
without the availability of the death penalty.”); Allen & Shavell, supra note 91, at 
630–31, 639 (noting that a Lexis-Nexis search from 1999–2005 revealed more 
than thirty instances of inmates committing murder); WILLIAM WELD & PAUL 
CASSELL, REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND 
THE SENTENCING COMMISSION 28 (Feb. 13, 1987) (“At least five federal prison 
officers have been killed since December 1982, and the inmates in at least three 
of the incidents were already serving life sentences for murder.”).  
 105. Cassell, supra note 103, at 187–88. 
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Imprisonment therefore cannot eliminate the risk of murder; 
it merely limits the pool of possible victims from the general public 
to (at best) guards, administrative personnel, and other prisoners. 
Their lives matter too, and a legislature can legitimately decide not 
to make them bear that risk. 
It is also far from obvious that a legislature must assemble 
proof that the death penalty has a marginally greater deterrent 
value than life imprisonment (with or without the possibility of 
parole) before it can impose that punishment for a crime.106 There 
                                                                                                     
 106. Belief in the deterrent effect of punishment, including capital 
punishment, has ancient origins. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, 
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 1 (1973) (“Belief in the 
deterrent efficacy of penal sanctions is as old as the criminal law itself.” (quoting 
Norval Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 627, 631 (1966))); 
Morris, supra note 106, at 631 (“As Sir Arthur Goodhart wrote, if punishment 
‘cannot deter then we might as well scrap the whole of our criminal law.’” (footnote 
omitted)). That belief “has informed and does inform political, administrative, and 
judicial policy to so great a degree that deterrence has been described as a 
‘primary and essential postulate’ of almost all criminal law systems.” ZIMRING & 
HAWKINS, supra note 106, at 1. Accompanying that postulate is “the alleged 
truism that men fear death more than any other penalty, and that therefore it 
must be a stronger deterrent than imprisonment.” H.L.A. Hart, Murder and the 
Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 433, 
458 (1957). Hart goes on to quote Victorian judge and criminal law historian 
James Fitzjames Stephen:  
No other punishment deters men so effectively from committing crimes 
as the punishment of death. This is one of those propositions which it 
is difficult to prove, simply because they are in themselves more 
obvious than any proof can make them. It is possible to display 
ingenuity in arguing against it, but that is all. The whole experience of 
mankind is in the other direction. The threat of instant death is the 
one to which resort has always been made when there was an absolute 
necessity for producing some result. . . . No one goes to certain 
inevitable death except by compulsion. Put the matter the other way. 
Was there ever a criminal who, when sentenced to death and brought 
out to die, would refuse the offer of a commutation of his sentence for 
the severest secondary punishment? Surely not. Why is this? It can 
only be because ‘All that a man has he will give for his life.’ Any 
secondary punishment, however, terrible, there is hope; but death is 
death; its terrors cannot be described more forcefully. 
Id. at 458. Stephens’ argument is flawed in several respects, but it is important 
to note the difference between the deterrent theory of punishment and modern 
theories of physics, such as Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. The latter can predict 
consequences with mathematical certainty and reliability. The former cannot 
because it is more a moral justification for the state’s use of punishment than a 
scientific explanation of how punishment works. The deterrent theory of 
punishment is one of several justifications for the state’s decision to inflict pain 
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is no freestanding principle that only effective legislation is 
constitutional.107 As far as the text of the Constitution is 
                                                                                                     
on an offender for breaking the law. The raison d'être for that and all other 
justifications is simply to distinguish that form of public violence from the private 
ones that offenders inflict on the public.  
[T]heories of punishment are not theories in any normal sense. They 
are not, as scientific theories are, assertions or contentions as to what 
is or is not the case; the atomic theory or kinetic theory of gasses is a 
theory of this sort. On the contrary, those major positions concerning 
punishment which are called deterrent or retributive or reformative 
‘theories’ of punishment are moral claims as to what justified the 
practice of punishment—claims as to why, morally, it should or may be 
used. 
Id. at 466–67. Demanding that capital punishment justify its constitutionality by 
proving its marginal utility over life imprisonment as a deterrent therefore misses 
the point. As explained below, reasonable people can disagree over the deterrent 
effect of capital punishment. Under those circumstances, we allow the people to 
select a governing theory of punishment through the democratic process. See infra 
notes 119 & 125 (discussing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and that 
whether deterrence is effective should be left to legislatures). 
 107. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984) (“[T]his 
Act . . . may not achiev[e] its intended goals. When the legislature’s purpose is 
legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical 
debates over the wisdom of takings . . . are not to be carried out in the federal 
courts.”); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–72 
(1981) (“[W]hether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the 
question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if . . . the . . . [state] 
Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its 
objective.”); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979) (“‘It makes no difference 
that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed by argument and opinion of 
serious strength. It is not within the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such 
contrariety.’” (quoting Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916))). 
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., the Supreme Court addressed this 
issue further in depth:  
States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their 
legislative judgments. Rather, those challenging the legislative 
judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which 
the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived 
to be true by the governmental decision-maker . . . . Although parties 
challenging legislation under the Equal Protection Clause may 
introduce evidence supporting their claim that it is irrational, . . . they 
cannot prevail so long as it is evident from all the considerations 
presented to the legislature, and those of which we may take judicial 
notice, that the question is at least debatable . . . . Where there was 
evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the 
classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation 
merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was 
mistaken . . . . The Equal Protection Clause does not deny the State of 
Minnesota the authority to ban one type of milk container conceded to 
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concerned, the relevant provision is the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.108 The Framers took that 
clause from the English Bill of Rights of 1689109 and intended it to 
prohibit only hideously painful punishments, ones that were not 
authorized by law, and (perhaps) grossly disproportionate 
penalties.110 Neither that clause nor its lineal ancestor compels a 
legislature to prove that a more severe punishment is a marginally 
better deterrent than a less onerous penalty for it to be a lawful 
sanction.111  
Moreover, it would have been unfathomable to the 
Framers112—or to anyone in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
                                                                                                     
cause environmental problems, merely because another type, already 
established in the market, is permitted to continue in use. Whether in 
fact the Act will promote more environmentally desirable milk 
packaging is not the question: the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied 
by our conclusion that the Minnesota Legislature could rationally have 
decided that its ban on plastic nonreturnable milk jugs might foster 
greater use of environmentally desirable alternatives. 
449 U.S. 456, 464, 466 (1981) (citations, footnote, and internal punctuation 
omitted).  
 108. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). That fact 
is significant because the Supreme Court has often made it clear that the courts 
should consider only the specific constitutional provision addressing a particular 
subject. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (noting 
that substantive due process analysis is inappropriate if a party’s claim is 
“covered by” a different constitutional provision); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 
273 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source 
of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, 
‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” 
must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 395 (1989))). 
 109. An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the 
Succession of the Crown (The Bill of Rights), 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1688–89), 
reprinted in 9 Statutes at Large 67 (Pickering 1764). 
 110. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967–73, 973 n.4, 979–85 
(1991) (plurality opinion) (examining the history of the phrase “cruel and unusual 
punishment”); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169–70, 170 n.17 (same); Anthony F. Granucci, 
“Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. 
L. REV. 839, 839–44 (1969) (same). 
 111. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 (“We may not require the legislature to select 
the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly 
inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment “explicitly contemplates” capital 
punishment). 
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centuries—for someone to claim that capital punishment can be a 
lawful penalty only if it is a superior deterrent to crime than long-
term imprisonment. That is true for a host of reasons: Every 
common law felony was a capital crime;113 the text of the 
Constitution expressly recognized that capital punishment would 
be imposed for some offenses;114 the First Congress adopted several 
capital crimes;115 imprisonment did not exist as a punishment 
until early in the eighteenth century;116 and the first federal 
prisons did not go into operation until the cusp of the twentieth 
century.117 To be sure, the Supreme Court has greatly expanded 
the scope of that clause over the past sixty years, and occasionally 
it has concluded that the death penalty is an excessive punishment 
for certain crimes or offenders.118 The Court, however, has left to 
the political process the authority to decide the question whether 
capital punishment simpliciter is an effective deterrent.119 Neither 
                                                                                                     
 113. See supra note 16 (citing cases explaining the history of capital 
punishment). 
 114. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury; . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.” (emphasis added)). 
 115. See Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 3, 8–10, 14, 23, 1 Stat. 112 (1790) 
(imposing mandatory capital punishment for treason, certain types of murder, 
murder or robbery on the high seas, piracy, and other crimes). 
 116. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303, 
308 (2013). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See infra text accompanying notes 146–149 (discussing various 
categories of individuals and situations where the death penalty is automatically 
not imposed). 
 119. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185–86 (1976)  
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex 
factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the 
legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in 
terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility . . . not 
available to the courts . . . . Indeed, many of the post-Furman statutes 
reflect just such a responsible effort to define those crimes and those 
criminals for which capital punishment is most probably an effective 
deterrent. “In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia 
Legislature that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases 
is clearly wrong. Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for 
the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, 
the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility 
as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing 
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the text of nor the background to the Eighth Amendment justifies 
abandoning that position. 
In any event, the empirical question whether capital 
punishment actually deters homicide to a greater extent than life 
imprisonment—with or without the possibility of parole—has 
vexed the criminal justice system for decades (as has the question 
whether life imprisonment alone deters). Reasonable people have 
lined up on both sides of the issue. Originally, participants in that 
debate invoked logic, anecdotes, or competing psychological 
theories to bolster their arguments.120 Some economists and 
sociologists have conducted regression analyses of the available 
data and have concluded that capital punishment has a 
measurable deterrent advantage over life imprisonment.121 As 
                                                                                                     
evidence, that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not 
without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe. 
(citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 403–05 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)); 
see also id. at 206 (White, J., concurring) (incorporating by reference Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 354–56 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)). 
 120. See generally ROYAL COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949–1953, 
REPORT: PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HER MAJESTY (Sept. 1953); 
HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 
(Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1967); supra note 106. 
 121. See generally DALE O. CLONINGER & ROBERTO MARCHESINI, EXECUTION 
MORATORIUMS, COMMUTATIONS AND DETERRENCE: THE CASE OF ILLINOIS, Econ. 
Working Paper Archive, Working Paper No. 0507002 (2005), 
mcadams.posc.mu.edu/blog/Illinois_study.pdf; Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto 
Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 
APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001); Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Evidence from a “Judicial Experiment,” 
44 ECON. INQUIRY 512 (2006); Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital 
Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel 
Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003); Isaac Ehrlich & Zhiqiang Liu, Sensitivity 
Analysis of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let’s Keep the Econ in Econometrics, 42 J. 
L. & ECON. 455 (1999); Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some 
Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977); Isaac 
Ehrlich & John Gibbons, On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1977); Isaac 
Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209 (1975); Isaac 
Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 
65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975); Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and the 
Deterrence Hypothesis: Some New Insights and Empirical Evidence, 30 E. ECON. 
J. 237 (2004); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: 
Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & 
ECON. 453, 453 (2003); David P. Phillips, The Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. SOC. 139 (1980); 
Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment's 
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Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have noted, “the 
recent evidence of a deterrent effect from capital punishment 
seems impressive, especially in light of its “‘apparent power and 
unanimity.’”122 Other scholars, however, doubt that conclusion.123 
                                                                                                     
Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203 (2005); Joanna M. 
Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital 
Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 308 (2004); Steven Stack, Publicized 
Executions and Homicide, 1950–1980, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 532 (1987); James A. 
Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide? Some Time Series 
Evidence, 5 J. BEHAV. ECON. 45 (1976); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, 
Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004). 
 122. Sunstein & Vermeule, Life-Life Tradeoffs, supra note 91, at 713  (quoting 
Robert Weisberg, The Death Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury 
Behavior Under New Scrutiny, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 151, 159 (2005)). 
Sunstein and Vermeule do note, however, that even the new studies do not 
conclusively prove that capital punishment has a deterrent effect. See id. 
But in studies of this kind, it is hard to control for confounding 
variables, and reasonable doubts inevitably remain. Most broadly, 
skeptics are likely to question the mechanisms by which capital 
punishment is said to have a deterrent effect. In the skeptical view, 
many murderers lack a clear sense of the likelihood and perhaps even 
the existence of executions in their states; further problems for the 
deterrence claim are introduced by the fact that capital punishment is 
imposed infrequently and after long delays. Emphasizing the weakness 
of the deterrent signal, Steven Levitt has suggested that “it is hard to 
believe that fear of execution would be a driving force in a rational 
criminal’s calculus in modern America.” And, of course, some criminals 
do not act rationally: many murders are committed in a passionate 
state that does not lend itself to an all-things-considered analysis on 
the part of perpetrators. 
(quoting Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four 
Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 175 
(2004)). 
 123. See generally William C. Bailey, Murder, Capital Punishment, and 
Television: Execution Publicity and Homicide Rates, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 628 (1990); 
William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder and Capital Punishment: A 
Monthly Time-Series Analysis of Execution Publicity, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 722 (1989); 
David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin 
and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 
(1975); Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà 
Vu All over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303 (2005); William J. Bowers & 
Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital 
Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses 
and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
791 (2005); Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and 
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003); Peter Passell & J.B. Taylor, The 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 445 
(1977); Peter Passell, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 
28 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1975); Jon K. Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital 
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It could be that each side’s view of the evidence is colored by its 
judgment about the morality of the death penalty.124 At the end of 
the day, the debate may prove only that reasonable people can 
disagree over this issue, and we leave disputes over the efficacy of 
government programs to be resolved in the legislatures and at the 
ballot boxes.125 
Does that mean there will never be an instance in which newly 
discovered evidence proves beyond any doubt that a condemned 
prisoner is innocent? Of course not—people make mistakes, and 
even serious mistakes can go unremedied despite numerous 
opportunities for correction.126 Unfortunately, the work of the 
                                                                                                     
Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 (1976); Ruth D. Peterson 
& William C. Bailey, Felony Murder and Capital Punishment: An Examination of 
the Deterrence Question, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 367 (1991); Sunstein & Vermeule, Life-
Life Tradeoffs, supra note 122. See also Sunstein & Vermeule, Life-Life Tradeoffs, 
supra note 91, at 711–14 (collecting authorities finding that capital punishment 
has a deterrent effect); id. at 708–09 n.16 (collecting authorities criticizing the 
deterrence studies); see also James Fox & Michael Radelet, Persistent Flaws in 
Econometric Studies of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 23 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 29, 29–30, 29 n.3 (1989) (collecting criticisms of Ehrlich’s original study). 
 124. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 281 (“There was a raging methodological 
disagreement [among economists] over how to pick the best variables [to measure 
the deterrent effect of the death penalty], and a nagging suspicion that 
researchers’ own attitudes toward capital punishment were subconsciously 
influencing the forms of equations.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, Reply, supra note 91, 
at 857 n.10 (“Those who oppose the death penalty on moral grounds often seem 
entirely unwilling to consider apparent evidence of deterrence. . . . Those who 
accept the death penalty on moral grounds often seem to accept the claim of 
deterrence whether or not good evidence has been provided.”). Two conclusions 
seem true in this regard: Indisputable proof of capital punishment’s greater 
deterrent effect would never persuade death penalty opponents to abandon their 
campaign against the death penalty, and equally persuasive proof of the lack of a 
deterrent effect would not persuade capital punishment defenders to settle for a 
lesser penalty. See Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 103, at 26 (“[T]he deterrence 
argument is beside the point. Death penalty opponents never . . . concede they 
would change their minds if they were somehow to learn that [it] does deter. At 
the same time, people who support the death penalty do not care all that much if 
it deters crime.”). 
 125. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185–86 (1976) (“The value of capital 
punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of 
which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of 
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility . . . 
not available to the courts.”); see also supra note 119 (citing Gregg). 
 126. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (“[H]istory is replete with 
examples of wrongfully convicted persons who have been pardoned in the wake of 
after-discovered evidence establishing their innocence.”). 
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Innocence Project proves that this scenario is true. Sixty-one 
condemned inmates were released from prison from 1987 to 1999 
alone.127 Some of them were exonerated by DNA evidence; the rest, 
because of the post-sentencing discovery of perjured testimony by 
dishonest witnesses or law enforcement officers.128  
If such a case were to arise, should the governor exercise his 
clemency authority? Of course he should. No governor should 
knowingly send an innocent man to the gallows. That would be 
tantamount to murder. It would, moreover, arm capital 
punishment’s opponents with their most powerful argument for 
abolition.129 In any event, governors are not reluctant to consider 
a condemned prisoner’s evidence of his innocence: doubts about a 
condemned prisoner’s guilt have served since Gregg as the most 
common reason why governors have commuted a death 
sentence.130 
Ironically, the same DNA evidence that has been used to 
establish the innocence of numerous wrongly convicted parties 
reduces the likelihood that a state will execute an innocent man. 
DNA proof will not be available in every capital case, but, where it 
is available, it can powerfully exculpate or inculpate someone. 
When used early in the investigation or charging process, it can 
eliminate suspects from being charged, avoiding a mistaken 
conviction. Where it is used later in the process, it can exonerate 
the wrongfully convicted. Yet, as one scholar has noted, “one less 
appreciated aspect of increased DNA testing in the post-conviction 
appeals context is that from a statistical standpoint, DNA testing 
supports capital convictions far more often than it calls convictions 
into question.”131 The result is this “paradox”: DNA evidence has 
reduced the number of parties wrongfully charged with or 
convicted of a capital crime, but in the process it has reduced a 
governor’s need to grant clemency to someone who can raise a 
reasonable doubt about his guilt.132 
                                                                                                     
 127. BANNER, supra note 15, at 303. 
 128. Id. at 303–04. 
 129. Id. at 304–05. 
 130. See Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 7 (“The most common reason for 
governors’ commuting a sentence [from 1976 to 2013] from death to life 
imprisonment relates to doubts about the inmate’s guilt.”). 
 131. Heise, Unequal Grace, supra note 2, at 965. 
 132. See id. (discussing this paradox of the Innocence Project’s “legacy”). 
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The bottom line is this: the specter of executing an innocent 
man, on which capital punishment opponents often rely, may be 
just that: an illusion, not reality. At worst, the specter appears far 
more often in academic journals than in real cases. To be sure, that 
risk is always present, but whether it should lead to the abolition 
of capital punishment hinges on the utilitarian judgment whether 
the benefits of that penalty outweigh its costs.133 That is a 
macro-level judgment based on factors that are irrelevant to the 
micro-level question of whether a particular person is innocent. 
The two issues are distinct and must be answered separately. If 
there is reason for Congress and state legislatures to believe that 
capital punishment deters homicides that would not otherwise 
have occurred—and recent scholarship argues that there is134—
legislatures can legitimately and reasonably decide to prefer the 
innocent lives that will be lost to homicide over the ones that would 
be lost to the mistaken imposition of the death penalty.135 
                                                                                                     
 133. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 304 (“The prospect of killing an innocent 
person seemed to be the one thing that could cause people to rethink their support 
for capital punishment.”). 
 134. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2748 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Justice Breyer speculates that it does not ‘seem likely’ that the death penalty 
has a ‘significant’ deterrent effect. . . . It seems very likely to me, and there are 
statistical studies that say so.”). 
 135. See Markman & Cassell, supra note 88, at 159–60 (“The minimal but 
unavoidable risk of error in the administration of capital punishment must not 
be allowed to induce a ‘failure of nerve’ that would paralyze society from taking 
steps necessary to protect its citizens.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, Reply, supra note 
91, at 856 (“In the United States, at least, no one is likely to execute innocent 
people in order to produce greater deterrence.”).  
I find the critics’ argument unpersuasive for another reason too, one that I can 
only sketch here. They assume that American society has a greater interest in 
preventing mistakes before or at trial than it actually has. In truth, the public—
and some Supreme Court justices for that matter—are quite hypocritical in their 
attitude toward the operation of the criminal process. 
Justice Hugo Black once wrote that “[t]here can be no equal justice where the 
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1965) (plurality opinion). But neither he nor the other 
justices have ever taken that Olympian statement seriously. If the Court did, it 
would cap the amount of money that people like Bill Gates or Warren Buffet could 
spend at a trial were they ever charged with a crime or order the states to provide 
to each defendant the same amount of money that those two people could spend. 
Yet, we know that the public has never expressed sufficient outrage to force states 
to choose either option. See, e.g., Dominick Dunne, The Verdict, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 
1992), http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/1992/03/dunne199203 (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2016) (discussing the William Kennedy Smith rape trial) (on file with the 
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IV. Capital Punishment, Clemency, and Severity 
Correcting an unjust sentence has been an historic rationale 
for clemency.136 Critics will maintain that clemency is necessary to 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
Two other defense attorneys had preceded [Roy] Black on this case: 
Herbert ‘Jack’ Miller of Washington, D.C., who had been Senator 
Edward Kennedy’s lawyer in the Chappaquiddick affair in 1969 and 
who was replaced after the prosecution likened his strategy to those he 
had used at that time, and Mark Schnapp of Miami, who received a call 
from Willie Smith two days after the incident and remained on the case 
as part of the four-lawyer defense team after Black took over. Although 
Black reportedly received only a quarter of a million dollars for his 
services, a relatively low fee considering the family involved, he took 
the case because of the international attention focused on it. However, 
the total amount spent on Smith’s defense seemed, by comparison with 
the money the prosecution spent, prodigious. Five private investigators 
worked for months digging up information on the background of 
Patricia Bowman, as well as of Anne Mercer and her boyfriend, Chuck 
Desiderio, the two people Bowman telephoned to come to the Kennedy 
compound on the night of the incident. In addition, a dozen or so expert 
witnesses were called to cast doubt on Bowman’s story. 
Id. It has been fifty years since Justice Black penned that remark in Griffin, and 
the Court has done nothing of the kind since then, and it never will. It is one thing 
to make such grandiose statements, another to mean them. A far better reflection 
of the Court’s attitude toward the criminal process is its decision in McCleskey v. 
Kemp. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). McCleskey challenged the constitutionality of the 
death penalty on the ground that the evidence showed a material difference in 
the likelihood of receiving the death penalty based on the race of the victim, with 
juries far less likely to sentence a killer to death when the victim was black. See 
id. at 286 (stating that McCleskey’s evidence “purport[ed] to show a disparity in 
the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder 
victim”). The Court assumed that McCleskey’s statistics were correct but rejected 
his argument for several reasons, one of them being that its effect, if true, would 
call into question the operation of the entire criminal justice system. See id. at 
314–15 (“McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious 
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”). It may 
be cynical to say it, but the public is willing to be hypocritical about the operation 
of the criminal justice system. As long as it believes that only other people can 
wind up in its maw and as long as it does not see too many of the system’s warts 
on television, the public is glad to let the criminal process operate with whatever 
degree of accuracy the system’s professionals can produce. That certainly won’t 
be the degree of accuracy that Judge Kozinski and other professionals expect the 
criminal justice system to have, see, e.g., Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 
44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2015) (“Although we pretend otherwise, 
much of what we do in the law is guesswork.”), but they underestimate the 
number of errors that most members of the public are willing to overlook (as long 
as those individuals are not the ones mistakenly locked up).  
 136. Alexander Hamilton made this point in the Federalist Papers.  
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ensure that the death penalty is an appropriate punishment in 
capital cases. That argument, however, is unpersuasive. It is true 
that Presidents and governors no longer grant clemency in capital 
cases with the same frequency society witnessed for most of 
American history.137 It is also true that the reason why is, in part, 
because of the fear that extending mercy to a killer will prove 
politically costly.138 But that is not the only or even the principal 
                                                                                                     
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign 
prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or 
embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of 
necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor 
of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary 
and cruel. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
The need has endured since then. As one commentator noted early in the 
twentieth century,  
The very nature of criminal law makes such a power vested somewhere 
essential to relieve the vigor and cruelty of the law. The law must. In 
theory, apply to all persons alike. It cannot take into consideration the 
particular individual, nor the defects or injustices that frequently arise 
in its consideration. Cases frequently arise to which no general rule 
can apply without the gravest of injustic–es, and the most grievous 
inhumanity, cases where had the legislature known of the particular 
facts, and had been familiar with the general surroundings, it would 
have relieved them of the general terms of the law, and the courts had 
they the power, would have exempted them from the particular 
statute. 
Goodrich, supra note 1, at 336–37. The problem still exists today. See, e.g., United 
States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d, 433 F.3d 738 (10th 
Cir. 2005); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 71 (2011); Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, 
Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2015); Jane L. Fryod, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level 
Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1491 
(2000) (“[T]he [Sentencing] Guidelines provide graduated, proportional increases 
in sentence severity for additional misconduct or prior convictions, whereas 
mandatory minimums sentences do not.”); cf. Brian Ledewitz & Scott Staples, The 
Role of Executive Clemency in Modern Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 227, 234–
35 (1993) (arguing that executive clemency has been and should also be used if 
an offender undergoes a fundamental character change in prison). 
 137. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 291 (“For centuries governors commuted 
death sentences in significant numbers. That pattern continued for the first 
two-thirds of the twentieth century. Florida commuted nearly a quarter of its 
death sentences between 1924 and 1966. North Carolina commuted more than a 
third between 1909 and 1954.”). 
 138. See id. (“Part of clemency’s decline was attributable to the growing 
popularity and salience of the death penalty. . . . [M]any of the post-Gregg 
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reason for the steep drop-off in the number of commuted death 
sentences over the last forty years. 
Beginning in the 1960s, the battle over capital punishment 
shifted from the political arena to the courts.139 Judges assumed 
the responsibility that governors historically had performed to 
ensure that a death sentence was imposed fairly.140 The Supreme 
Court has played the principal role in that transition. Since its 
decision in Furman v. Georgia forty years ago, the Court has 
rigorously scrutinized the capital sentencing process on the ground 
that the death penalty is different in kind from any other 
punishment.141 In the process, the Court has developed a 
considerable body of case law identifying the types of sentencing 
schemes that do and do not satisfy constitutional requirements.  
The Court has upheld sentencing schemes that use reasonably 
defined aggravating circumstances to limit the class of 
death-eligible defendants and allow a defendant to introduce 
virtually any evidence that he considers mitigating.142 By contrast, 
the presence of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor—a 
factor whose terms are so vague that the sentencing party has no 
effective guidance to determine whether it is present143—could 
                                                                                                     
commutations were granted by governors who did not intend to seek reelection.”). 
 139. See id. at 231–66, 285–86 (discussing the Supreme Court’s role in the 
death penalty process); MELTSNER, supra note 50, at 20 (same). 
 140. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 291–93 (“Judges, not governors, now 
decided whether trials had been conducted fairly . . . .”).  
 141. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976) (stating that 
“death is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than in 
degree”).  
 142. For cases upholding capital sentences in those circumstances, see 
generally Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 
(1995); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 
U.S. 1 (1994); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 
370 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); California v. Brown, 
479 U.S. 538 (1987); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 143. See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 235 (1992) (“A vague 
aggravating factor employed for the purpose of determining whether a defendant 
is eligible for the death penalty fails to channel the sentencer’s discretion.”); 
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (holding that the aggravating 
circumstance provision of Oklahoma’s death penalty statute was 
unconstitutionally vague); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (same, 
Georgia Supreme Court’s interpretation of Georgia statute ). 
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require that a death sentence be set aside.144 In addition, the Court 
has found that restrictions on a defendant’s ability to introduce 
most types of mitigating evidence deny him the opportunity to 
argue in favor of a sentence less than death.145  
That is not all. Since its decision in Gregg, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that certain categories of offenders cannot be executed 
at all, regardless of the procedures used at sentencing. Those 
categories consist of offenders who were minors at the time of the 
crime;146 who are mentally retarded or developmentally 
                                                                                                     
 144. Some capital sentencing laws require the jury to weigh aggravating 
factors against mitigating factors. If an aggravating factor is unconstitutional, 
the sentence must be set aside and the case remanded for resentencing. See, e.g., 
Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (reaffirming the principle of 
setting aside sentences for unconstitutional aggravating factors); Sochor v. 
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992) (same); Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232 (1992) (same); 
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 319–321 (1991) (same); Clemons v. Mississippi, 
494 U.S. 738, 752 (1990) (same). By contrast, other states use the existence of 
aggravating factors only as a “bridge” that, once found, permits the jury to 
consider the death penalty in light of all the evidence in the case. The existence 
of an unconstitutional aggravating factor in a particular case does not 
automatically require a death sentence to be set aside. See, e.g., Zant, 462 U.S. at 
891 (1983) (holding that a death sentence was not constitutionally impaired by 
an invalid statutory aggravating circumstance held found by the jury). 
 145. For cases vacating capital sentences in those circumstances, see 
generally Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. 
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); 
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 
(1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 
(1979); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (concluding 
that “the [Constitution] require[s] that the sentence . . . not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record 
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death.”). But see Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 527 
(2006) (ruling that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to introduce 
evidence of an alibi that is inconsistent with the jury’s finding that he committed 
the crime); cf. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173 n.6 (1988) (plurality 
opinion) (doubting that a defendant can rely at capital sentencing on any 
“residual doubt” that the jury might have as to his guilt for a non-death sentence); 
id. at 187 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting that claim 
outright). 
 146. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (ruling that the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the execution of an offender who was 
a juvenile at the time of the crime). Not every juvenile, however, would always 
deserve some form of clemency. See CHARLES D. STIMSON & ANDREW M. GROSSMAN, 
ADULT TIME FOR ADULT CRIMES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR JUVENILE KILLERS AND 
VIOLENT TEENS 56 (2009) (“Used sparingly, as it is, life without parole is an 
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disabled;147 who did not themselves kill, attempt to kill, or intend 
either that a killing take place or that lethal force would be 
employed;148 and who are mentally incompetent at the time of their 
execution.149 Those factors historically served as a basis for 
executive clemency. Now, the Constitution has taken its place. 
Moreover, since Gregg, even when the evidence is insufficient to 
establish one of those exemptions as a matter of law, governors 
have relied on that evidence as a basis for clemency.150 
The Court has also shown special solicitude for claims of error 
in post-Gregg capital cases. For example, the Court has imposed 
stricter, defense-friendly rules on the capital sentencing process 
than those that apply to non-capital cases.151 Finally, in its 
self-assumed role as “Supreme Court of Capital Cases,” the Court 
has reviewed the legality of sentences imposed in cases that did 
                                                                                                     
effective and lawful sentence for the worst juvenile offenders. On the merits, it 
has a place in our laws.”). 
 147. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (ruling that the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded 
offender); accord Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2273 (2015) (applying 
Atkins). 
 148. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (adopting that rule). 
 149. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 418 (1986) (ruling that the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the execution of an offender 
incompetent at the time of his execution even if he was found competent to stand 
trial and sane at the time of the crime); accord Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 
930, 959 (2007) (applying Ford). 
 150. See Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 12–16 (noting that governors relied on 
an offender’s age, mental capacity, mental defect, and history of abuse as a child 
to grant clemency). 
 151. Compare, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991), Chapman 
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 466–67 (1991), and Ex parte United States, 242 
U.S. 27, 37 (1916) (holding that Congress and the states may impose mandatory 
sentences of imprisonment), with Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987), 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding that the states may not impose mandatory 
capital sentences even if the defendant commits a particularly egregious crime or 
is already serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole). Compare, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1949) 
(holding that due process does not require disclosure to the defense of information 
used to impose a death sentence), with Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 
(1977) (holding, post-Furman, that due process requires disclosure to the defense 
of any information used to impose a death sentence; overruling Williams for 
capital cases). 
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not involve the type of broad, precedent-setting legal issues that 
characterize nearly all of the Court’s noncapital decisions.152 
                                                                                                     
 152. For examples of the Supreme Court acting in that role, see Weary v. Cain, 
136 S. Ct. 1002, 1008 (2016) (engaging in a fact-specific application of the rule 
adopted in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that the prosecution must 
disclose exculpatory information to the defense); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 
2269, 2273 (2015) (issuing a fact-specific decision applying the rule adopted in 
Atkins that the state cannot execute a mentally retarded offender); Martinez v. 
Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2010) (engaging in a fact-specific inquiry whether 
offender could establish “cause” for failing to raise a claim earlier); Hinton v. 
Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1090 (2014) (issuing a fact-specific ruling that the 
capital defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel); Sears v. Upton, 561 
U.S. 945, 957 (2010) (engaging in a fact-specific inquiry whether petitioner 
suffered prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 684 (1984)); 
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 330 (2010) (engaging in a fact-specific 
inquiry whether offender’s habeas petition was a “second” or “successive” 
petition); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 (2009) (same); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 
449, 476 (2009) (engaging in a fact-specific application of Brady); Panetti, 551 
U.S. at 962 (applying the rule adopted in that the state cannot execute a 
condemned prisoner who is mentally incompetent at the time of his execution); 
Smith v. Texas (Smith II), 550 U.S. 297, 310 (2007), and Smith v. Texas (Smith 
I), 543 U.S. 37, 52 (2004) (engaging in two fact-specific inquiries whether jury 
instructions adequately allowed the jury to consider mitigating evidence); Brewer 
v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007) (engaging in a fact-specific application 
of the rule adopted in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), that a capital 
defendant must be allowed to offer relevant mitigating evidence); Abdul-Kabir v. 
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 240 (2007) (same); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 
393 (2005) (issuing a fact-specific ruling that the capital defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 176 (2005) 
(engaging in a fact-specific inquiry whether offender’s guilty plea was voluntary); 
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005) (engaging in a fact-specific application 
to the penalty phase of a capital case of the rule adopted in Holbrook v. Flynn, 
475 U.S. 560 (1986), that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles 
unless that use is justified by an essential state interest, such as the interest in 
courtroom security); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 289 (2004) (issuing a fact-
specific ruling that a particular condemned prisoner was entitled to appeal the 
denial of habeas relief to the circuit court of appeals, but without taking a position 
on the merits of his claim); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 680 (2004) (engaging 
in a fact-specific application of the rule adopted in Brady); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 538 (2003) (issuing a fact-specific ruling that the capital defendant 
received ineffective assistance of counsel); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 
48 (2001) (engaging in a fact-specific application of the rule adopted in Simmons 
v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), that a defendant in a capital case has the 
right to inform the jury that, under the governing state law, he would not be 
eligible for parole in the event that the jury sentences him to life imprisonment); 
Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996) (engaging in a fact-specific 
application of Brady); Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 12 (1995) (engaging in 
a fact-specific application of the rule adopted in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 
(1985), that in some circumstances a capital defendant has a right to assistance 
of a court-appointed psychiatrist); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 454 (1995) 
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One consequence of the Supreme Court’s repeated 
interventions is that the capital sentencing process is materially 
different today than it was as recently as the middle of the 
twentieth century. From the founding of the nation through that 
point, the clemency process was the principal mechanism for 
correcting errors at the guilt or sentencing stages of a capital case 
and for ensuring that the death penalty was appropriate for an 
individual offender.153 Governors granted relief for trial errors that 
appellate courts would today use as a basis for granting an offender 
a new trial or sentencing hearing. Governors also used their 
pardon power to tailor the punishment to the heinousness of the 
crime or the incorrigibility of the offender.154 For example, 
governors would grant an offender clemency if he was young, an 
inexperienced criminal, unlikely to reoffend, or the product of a 
criminogenic environment.155 Today, by contrast, the defendant 
                                                                                                     
(engaging in a fact-specific application of Brady); Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 
1079, 1081 (1992) (engaging in a fact-specific application of the rule in Clemons 
v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), that a sentencer may not weigh an invalid 
aggravating factor); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992) (engaging in a 
fact-specific application of Clemons); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) 
(engaging in a fact-specific application of the rule adopted in Harper v. 
Washington, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), that the Due Process Clause establishes 
requirements before a capital defendant may be involuntarily medicated to enable 
him to stand trial); Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562, 568 (1992) (engaging in a fact-
specific inquiry whether an offender preserved a claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992) (issuing a fact-
specific answer to the question of whether the particular Supreme Court decisions 
in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), or Clemons, amounted to a “new 
rule” under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), that generally cannot be raised 
in federal habeas corpus); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 323 (1991) (engaging 
in a fact-specific inquiry whether the trial judge adequately considered mitigating 
evidence); Selvage v. Collins, 494 U.S. 108, 110 (1990) (engaging in a fact-specific 
inquiry whether petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred); Truesdale v. Aiken, 
480 U.S. 527, 527 (1987) (engaging in a fact-specific inquiry whether a capital 
offender was able to offer relevant mitigating evidence at trial); Bowden v. 
Francis, 470 U.S. 1079, 1079 (1985) (engaging in a fact-specific application of the 
rule adopted in Ake). 
 153. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 56–58 (noting that clemency was the only 
means available to correct errors that occurred at trial and also served to spare 
“incidental” from hardened and “viscious[]” criminals).  
 154. See id. at 54–55 (“While every death sentence was the same, the 
circumstances of every capital crime were different, and so were the life histories 
of the condemned criminals. The power of clemency was understood as a means 
by which the state could tailor the sentence to the individual case.”). 
 155. See id. at 57–58  
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has the right to offer such mitigating evidence at sentencing to 
avoid a death sentence, the jury has the responsibility to determine 
whether an offender is eligible for the death penalty, the jury or 
trial judge must decide whether that punishment is appropriate, 
and state appellate courts review the conviction and sentence.156  
The result has been to leave a chief executive with little or no 
reason to halt an execution. Local juries and judges have already 
filtered out those offenders to whom governors would have 
historically granted a commutation. By the time that a condemned 
prisoner has run out of legal challenges to his sentence and applies 
for clemency, the chances are virtually nil that the death penalty 
is an unduly severe or inappropriate punishment for him: 
“Clemency was once a regular part of the capital sentencing 
process, but once the process was constitutionalized, clemency 
                                                                                                     
Where the condemned person’s guilt was clear and his trial conducted 
properly, youth or inexperience as a criminal might save him from 
being hanged. This was a second function served by clemency, that of 
classifying offenders according to what was often called their 
‘character,’ which tended to be synonymous with the perceived 
likelihood that they would commit more crimes in the future.  
See also id. at 103 (“Youth and inexperience had long been common reasons to 
grant clemency, especially when the condemned person had been under the sway 
of an older, hardened offender, so the idea that a person could be influenced to 
commit a crime by those around him was a familiar one.”). 
 156. See id. at 286 (“In the end the [Supreme] Court held that the states could 
not restrict the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence—that the jury must be 
allowed to consider any kind of evidence that might point against a death 
sentence, not . . . the evidence relevant to one of the statutory mitigating 
circumstances.” (footnote omitted)). The jury must make the findings necessary 
to establish that a convicted defendant is eligible for the death penalty. See Hurst 
v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016) (“The Sixth Amendment protects a 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury. This right required Florida to base [the 
defendant’s] death sentence on a jury’s verdict, not a judge’s factfinding.”); Ring 
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the fact-
finding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the 
fact-finding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth 
Amendment applies to both.”). Once the jury makes the necessary eligibility 
findings, it or the trial judge can decide what sentence is appropriate for a 
particular defendant. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624; see also Alleyne v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 (2013) (“Our ruling today does not mean that any fact that 
influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury.”); United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select 
a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury 
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”).  
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became a freak occurrence.”157 As Professor Stuart Banner has 
explained:  
Part of clemency’s decline was attributable to the growing 
popularity and salience of the death penalty. A commutation 
could be political suicide for an elected official in the new 
climate, and so many of the post-Gregg commutations were 
granted by governors who did not intend to seek reelection. But 
of course the death penalty had also been very popular in earlier 
eras, when governors had nevertheless commuted death 
sentences in large numbers. The difference after Gregg was that 
the courts were now handling many of the kinds of cases that 
had once been suitable for clemency instead. Judges, not 
governors, now decided whether trials had been conducted 
fairly, so when considering applications for clemency governors 
tended to defer to the courts that resolved the defendant’s 
constitutional claims. Such deference left a vacuum in cases 
where the death penalty seemed too severe, or where the 
defendant might have been innocent, because these were issues 
courts normally did not consider. Where the sentence had been 
affirmed as constitutional at all stages of judicial review, 
however, the assumption within governors’ offices tended to be 
that the sentence ought not to be disturbed, an assumption very 
different from the one that had prevailed for the preceding 
several centuries, when the executive branch was supposed to 
exercise its independent judgment as to the propriety of an 
execution. When the courts moved in, the governors moved 
out.158  
Of course, a governor could always disagree with the judgment 
of the local citizens and officials about the appropriateness of 
executing a particular defendant, and there may be cases where it 
is sensible to remove a specific prisoner from death row. The 
argument, however, that chief executives should do so on a regular 
basis is nothing more than a thinly veiled effort to persuade the 
chief executive to nullify the capital sentencing laws in the 
relevant jurisdiction under the disguise of exercising clemency. 
One final point: Critics of the current use of executive 
clemency argue that governors should be willing “to forgive the 
unforgiveable.”159 Yet, those critics and death penalty opponents 
                                                                                                     
 157. BANNER, supra note 15, at 291. 
 158. Id. at 291–92. 
 159. Molly Clayton, Note, Forgiving the Unforgivable: Reinvigorating the Use 
of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. REV. 751 (2013). 
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generally do not discuss the facts of the cases that take offenders 
to death row. Some condemned prisoners committed multiple 
murders. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—one of the “Boston Marathon 
Bombers”—murdered three people, maimed seventeen, and 
injured more than 200.160 Jerry William Correll murdered four 
people, including his five-year-old daughter.161 Joseph Edward 
Duncan also murdered four people, one of whom was only thirteen 
years old, another only eight.162 Dustin Lee Honken murdered five 
people, including two girls, one age ten and the other age six, who 
were shot in the back of the head.163 Lawrence Sigmond Bittaker 
and Roy Norris, known as the “Toolbox Killers,” kidnapped and 
murdered five teenage girls.164 Erwin Charles Simants murdered 
six people, one of whom was a five-year-old, another was a 
seven-year-old, and a third was a ten-year-old.165 William George 
Bonin, dubbed the “Freeway Killer” in California, received the 
death penalty for each of the (at least) ten murders he 
                                                                                                     
 160. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2015); Judgment for United 
States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13-cr-10200-GAO-1 (D. Mass. June 24, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/file/643096/download; Press Release, Dep’t of 
Justice & U.S. Attorney’s Office, Judge Imposes Death Sentence for Boston 
Marathon Bomber (June 24, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/judge-
imposes-death-sentence-boston-marathon-bomber.  
 161. Correll v. State, 523 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. 1988). 
 162. United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 163. United States v. Honken, 541 F.3d 1146, 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2008). The 
Court described the facts:  
In 1993, after being indicted on federal drug trafficking charges, 
Dustin Lee Honken (Honken) and his girlfriend, Angela Johnson 
(Johnson), kidnapped and murdered a federal witness, the witness’s 
girlfriend, and the girlfriend’s two young daughters. Honken and 
Johnson murdered another potential federal witness three months 
later. . . . . Using the maps Johnson drew, officers discovered the bodies 
of Nicholson and the Duncan family, buried in a single hole located in 
a wooded area outside Mason City. Kandi and Amber each had a single 
bullet hole in the back of their heads. Nicholson and Duncan were 
bound, gagged, and shot multiple times, including once in the head. 
DeGeus’s body was found in a field a few miles away, face down in a 
shallow hole. DeGeus had been shot one or more times, and his skull 
was severely fragmented, requiring significant reconstruction. 
Id. 
 164. People v. Bittaker, 774 P.2d 659, 664 (Cal. 1989), as modified on denial 
of reh'g (Aug. 24, 1989). Only Bittaker received the death penalty. Id. at 1062. 
 165. State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881, 885 (Neb. 1977). 
THE DEMISE OF CAPITAL CLEMENCY 1341 
committed.166 George Banks murdered a dozen people.167 Randy 
Stephen Kraft, nicknamed, the “Freeway Killer” or the “Scorecard 
Killer,” murdered at least sixteen young men.168 John Wayne Gacy 
was sentenced to death for twelve murders even though he had 
murdered at least thirty-three young men.169 Finally, as noted 
earlier, Timothy McVeigh killed 168 people and wounded more 
                                                                                                     
 166. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 1995). The court described 
the facts as follows:  
Between 1979 and 1980, Bonin committed a string of shockingly brutal 
murders in Southern California. As a result of his activities, Bonin 
became known as the “Freeway Killer.” Although the details of each 
murder vary and need not be repeated here, they shared a number of 
common features. In general, Bonin would pick up boys between the 
ages of 12 and 19 years. After engaging in various forms of homosexual 
activity with the boys, Bonin would murder them. The victims were 
usually killed by strangulation. The bodies of the victims exhibited 
signs that they had been beaten around the face and elsewhere, 
including the genital area. Marks were found on the wrists and ankles 
of the victims, indicating that they had been tied. Several of the bodies 
exhibited other more gruesome injuries. When Bonin was through with 
the boys, he would then dump their nude bodies along Southern 
California freeways. 
Id. at 821; see also id. at 829 (describing Bonin’s earlier crimes). 
 167. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004). 
 168. People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 81 (Cal. 2000). 
 169. Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1993).  
John Wayne Gacy is a serial killer. Between 1972 and 1978 he enticed 
many young men to his home near Chicago for homosexual liaisons. At 
least 33 never left. Gacy tied up or handcuffed his partners, then 
strangled or choked them. Twenty-eight of the bodies were dumped 
into the crawl space under the Gacy residence; one was entombed 
under the driveway; the rest were thrown into the Des Plaines River. 
Gacy, who operated a construction business, had his workers dig 
trenches and throw lime into the crawl space. Gacy’s wife complained 
about an “awful stench.” But the slaughter continued until the 
disappearance of 15-year-old Robert Piest on December 11, 1978. Piest 
vanished after telling his mother that he was going to see a building 
contractor about a summer job. The presence of Gacy’s truck outside 
the place where Piest was to meet his potential employer led to Gacy’s 
arrest within two days.  
Id. Gacy received only 12 death sentences because the state could only prove 
that he had committed those murders after the Illinois capital sentencing 
statute had gone into effect. Id. 
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than 680 when he destroyed a federal building.170 Other cases 
could also be cited, but that would be just gilding the lily.171 
Other murderers acted not in the heat of passion, but rather 
under circumstances manifesting either the intent to make the 
victims suffer or total indifference toward their agony. For 
example, as the Supreme Court summarized it in Glossip v. Gross, 
here is how Benjamin Cole murdered his nine-month-old daughter 
and how he reacted to her death: “Cole murdered his 9-month-old 
daughter after she would not stop crying. Cole bent her body 
backwards until he snapped her spine in half. After the child died, 
Cole played video games.”172 Next, consider the facts in 
McCorquodale v. State,173 a case involving Timothy McCorquodale 
and another culprit named Leroy, a case that the Supreme Court 
once described as “a horrifying torture-murder”:174 
The appellant, after telling Donna how pretty she was, raised 
his fist and hit her across the face. When she stood up, he 
grabbed her by her blouse, ripping it off. He then proceeded to 
remove her bra and tied her hands behind her back with a nylon 
stocking. McCorquodale then removed his belt, which was 
fastened with a rather large buckle, and repeatedly struck 
Donna across the back with the buckle end of the belt. He then 
took off all her clothing and then bound her mouth with tape 
and a washcloth. Leroy then kicked Donna and she fell to the 
                                                                                                     
 170. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 171. For other cases of multiple murders drawn from decisions by the 
Supreme Court decisions and a few state courts, see infra Appendix B.  
 172. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2735 (2015) (quoting Cole v. State, 164 
P.3d 1089, 1092–93 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007)); see also Cole v. State, 164 P.3d 1089, 
1092 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).  
Appellant’s nine-month-old daughter, Brianna Cole, was murdered on 
December 20, 2002. According to the State Medical Examiner, 
Brianna’s spine had been snapped in half, and her aorta had been 
completely torn through due to non-accidental stretching. The official 
cause of death was described as a fracture of the spine with aortic 
laceration. . . . Appellant eventually admitted causing the fatal 
injuries. In a statement he gave to police, Appellant said he’d been 
trying, unsuccessfully, to get the child, who was lying on her stomach, 
to stop crying. Appellant eventually grabbed his daughter by the 
ankles and pushed her legs toward her head until she flipped over. This 
action broke the child’s back and resulted in fatal injuries. 
Id. 
 173. 211 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. 1974). 
 174. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976). 
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floor. McCorquodale took his cigarette and burned the victim on 
the breasts, the thigh, and the navel. He then bit one of Donna’s 
nipples and she began to bleed. He asked for a razor blade and 
then sliced the other nipple. He then called for a box of salt and 
poured it into the wounds he had made on her breasts. At this 
point Linda, who was eight months pregnant, became ill and 
went into the bedroom and closed the door. McCorquodale then 
lit a candle and proceeded to drip hot wax over Donna’s body. 
He held the candle about 1/2 inch from Donna’s vagina and 
dripped the hot wax into this part of her body. He then used a 
pair of surgical scissors to cut around the victim’s clitoris. 
While bleeding from her nose and vagina, Leroy forced the 
victim to perform oral sex on him while McCorquodale had 
intercourse with her. Then Leroy had intercourse with the 
victim while McCorquodale forced his penis into the victim’s 
mouth. McCorquodale then found a hard plastic bottle which 
was about 5 inches in height and placed an antiseptic solution 
within it, forcing this bottle into Donna's vagina and squirted 
the solution into her. The victim was then permitted to go to the 
bathroom to ‘get cleaned up.’ While she was in the bathroom, 
McCorquodale secured a piece of nylon rope and told Bonnie and 
her roommate that he was going ‘to kill the girl.’ He hid in a 
closet across the hall from the bathroom and when Donna came 
out of the bathroom he wrapped the nylon cord around her neck. 
Donna screamed, ‘My God, you’re killing me.’ As McCorquodale 
tried to strangle her, the cord cut into his hands and Donna fell 
to the floor. He fell on top of her and began to strangle her with 
his bare hands. He removed his hands and the victim began to 
have convulsions. He again strangled her and then pulled her 
head up and forward to break her neck. He covered her lifeless 
body with a sheet and departed the apartment to search for a 
means of transporting her body from the scene.175 
Consider Lisa Ann Coleman’s murder of nine-year-old 
Davontae Williams:176 
This case arises out of the death of nine-year-old Davontae 
Williams. On the morning of July 26, 2004, emergency services 
were summoned to Davontae’s home upon report of his 
“breathing difficulty.” Paramedic Troy Brooks arrived at the 
residence only minutes later to find Davontae “obviously dead,” 
inferring that Davontae had passed away several hours earlier. 
Davontae, Brooks testified, was clad only in bandages and a 
diaper, so “emaciated and underweight” that it was “shocking.” 
                                                                                                     
 175. McCorquodale, 211 S.E. at 579–80. 
 176. Coleman v. Thaler, 716 F.3d 895 (5th Cir. 2013).  
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Brooks and another paramedic each believed that nine-year-old 
Davontae weighed only twenty-five pounds. 
Crime Scene Investigator Regina Taylor testified that Davontae 
had “numerous injuries throughout . . . his entire body,” 
including a disfigured ear, swollen hands, a slit in his lip, and 
“ligature marks around his wrists and ankles.” Pediatrician 
Nancy Kellogg identified over 250 wounds on his corpse. Dr. 
Konzelmann testified that injuries to Davontae’s hands, arms, 
and ankles were consistent with his having been bound 
repeatedly. Konzelmann initially believed that Davontae had 
“life-threatening blunt-force injuries, perhaps bleeding on the 
brain, broken bones, et cetera” that caused his death. 
Ultimately, however, Dr. Konzelmann deemed the cause of 
Davontae’s death to be malnutrition with pneumonia. Dr. 
Peerwani, Chief Medical Examiner for Tarrant County, further 
testified that Davontae’s pneumonia resulted from his 
malnutrition. And although Davontae was born prematurely, 
Dr. Kellogg explained that Davontae previously had “a normal 
growth velocity;” a metabolic disease, she inferred, was not 
responsible for his malnutrition. According to the State of 
Texas, however, Lisa Coleman was.177 
Or the facts in the case of Williams Andrews:178 
“[Dale Pierre,] Andrews, and [Keith] Roberts were airmen 
stationed at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. Stanley Walker, 
Michelle Ansley, Carol Naisbitt, Cortney Naisbitt (son of Carol 
Naisbitt), and Orren W. Walker, Jr. (father of Stanley Walker) 
were tied up, made to lie on the floor, and forced to drink liquid 
Drano on the evening of April 22, 1974, in the basement of the 
Hi-Fi Shop in Ogden, Utah, by [Pierre] in company with 
Andrews, who aided [Pierre] by pouring the caustic substance 
into a plastic cup for accomplishment of these violent acts. 
[Pierre] and Andrews both had hand guns and [Pierre] finally 
shot all of the victims in the head with either a .25 caliber or .38 
caliber handgun, which caused the deaths, within a brief period 
of time during that April evening, of Stanley Walker, Michelle 
Ansley (who had also been raped by [Pierre] just before he shot 
her) and Carol Naisbitt. 
* * * * 
                                                                                                     
 177. Id. at 898. 
 178. Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986).  
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“[A]fter shooting [Orren Walker, Pierre] vehemently kicked a 
ball point pen into one of his ears and attempted to strangle him 
with a cord.”179 
Then, there are the facts of Weisheit v. State:180 
Early in the morning of April 10, 2010, the German Township 
Fire Department arrived at Weisheit’s Evansville, Indiana 
home, which was engulfed in flames. After the fire was 
extinguished, investigators found the bodies of eight-year-old 
Alyssa Lynch and five-year-old Caleb Lynch. The children and 
their pregnant mother Lisa Lynch, Weisheit’s girlfriend, had 
been living with Weisheit since 2008. On the night of the fire, 
Weisheit was home with the children while Lisa worked. 
Alyssa was found in a closet, where she had either been trapped 
inside or attempted to flee the fire. Over ninety percent of her 
body was charred black, and a pathologist thought it possible 
that she burned while she was still alive or as she asphyxiated 
to death from soot and smoke inhalation. She likely experienced 
a sensation similar to drowning in her final moments. 
Also charred beyond recognition, Caleb was found on his 
mattress, hog-tied with duct tape and with a 
twelve-inch-by-twelve-inch washcloth stuffed in his mouth and 
secured by duct tape. A railroad flare had been placed in his 
underwear, and another railroad flare was found under his 
body. The flare in his underwear burnt his left thigh while he 
was still alive and conscious. He died in agony of suffocation 
from soot and smoke inhalation.181 
* * * * 
In an act of extreme heinousness, Weisheit set fire to a house 
that he knew contained eight-year-old Alyssa Lynch and 
five-year-old Caleb Lynch. His innocent victims, one of whom he 
hog-tied with duct tape and gagged, spent the last moments of 
their young lives in torturous pain. Lisa Lynch trusted Weisheit 
to care for her children, and at his hands they suffered 
agonizing deaths. That Weisheit had been planning to murder 
the children and flee the state is evident from the fact that, on 
the day before the fire, he quit his job and withdrew all of the 
money in his bank account, and that on the night of the fire he 
packed the money along with his clothes and toiletries into his 
                                                                                                     
 179. Id. at 1258–59 (quoting State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1343–44 (Utah 
1977)). 
 180. 26 N.E.3d 3 (Ind. 2015). 
 181.  Id. at 6–8.  
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car before starting the deadly fire. And all because he 
apparently believed Lisa may have been unfaithful.182 
Let’s finish with the facts of the crimes committed by two 
brothers, Reginald and Jonathan Carr. The Supreme Court 
described their crimes in Kansas v. Carr:183 
In December 2000, brothers Reginald and Jonathan Carr set 
out on a crime spree culminating in the Wichita Massacre. On 
the night of December 7, Reginald Carr and an unknown man 
carjacked Andrew Schreiber, held a gun to his head, and forced 
him to make cash withdrawals at various ATMs. 
On the night of December 11, the brothers followed Linda Ann 
Walenta, a cellist for the Wichita symphony, home from 
orchestra practice. One of them approached her vehicle and said 
he needed help. When she rolled down her window, he pointed 
a gun at her head. When she shifted into reverse to escape, he 
shot her three times, ran back to his brother’s car, and fled the 
scene. One of the gunshots severed Walenta’s spine, and she 
died one month later as a result of her injuries. 
On the night of December 14, the brothers burst into a triplex 
at 12727 Birchwood, where roommates Jason, Brad, and Aaron 
lived. Jason’s girlfriend, Holly, and Heather, a friend of Aaron’s, 
were also in the house. Armed with handguns and a golf club, 
the brothers forced all five into Jason's bedroom. They 
demanded that they strip naked and later ordered them into the 
bedroom closet. They took Holly and Heather from the bedroom, 
demanded that they perform oral sex and digitally penetrate 
each other as the Carrs looked on and barked orders. They 
forced each of the men to have sex with Holly and then with 
Heather. They yelled that the men would be shot if they could 
not have sex with the women, so Holly—fearing for Jason’s 
life—performed oral sex on him in the closet before he was 
ordered out by the brothers. 
Jonathan then snatched Holly from the closet. He ordered that 
she digitally penetrate herself. He set his gun between her 
knees on the floor. And he raped her. Then he raped Heather. 
Reginald took Brad, Jason, Holly, and Aaron one-by-one to 
various ATMs to withdraw cash. When the victims returned to 
the house, their torture continued. Holly urinated in the closet 
because of fright. Jonathan found an engagement ring hidden 
in the bedroom that Jason was keeping as a surprise for Holly. 
                                                                                                     
 182. Id. at 19.  
 183. 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016). 
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Pointing his gun at Jason, he had Jason identify the ring while 
Holly was sitting nearby in the closet. Then Reginald took Holly 
from the closet, said he was not going to shoot her yet, and raped 
her on the dining-room floor strewn with boxes of Christmas 
decorations. He forced her to turn around, ejaculated into her 
mouth, and forced her to swallow. In a nearby bathroom, 
Jonathan again raped Heather and then again raped Holly. 
At 2 a.m.—three hours after the mayhem began—the brothers 
decided it was time to leave the house. They attempted to put 
all five victims in the trunk of Aaron’s Honda Civic. Finding 
that they would not all fit, they jammed the three young men 
into the trunk. They directed Heather to the front of the car and 
Holly to Jason’s pickup truck, driven by Reginald. Once the 
vehicles arrived at a snow-covered field, they instructed Jason 
and Brad, still naked, and Aaron to kneel in the snow. Holly 
cried, “Oh, my God, they’re going to shoot us.” Holly and 
Heather were then ordered to kneel in the snow. Holly went to 
Jason’s side; Heather, to Aaron. 
Holly heard the first shot, heard Aaron plead with the brothers 
not to shoot, heard the second shot, heard the screams, heard 
the third shot, and the fourth. She felt the blow of the fifth shot 
to her head, but remained kneeling. They kicked her so she 
would fall face-first into the snow and ran her over in the pickup 
truck. But she survived, because a hair clip she had fastened to 
her hair that night deflected the bullet. She went to Jason, took 
off her sweater, the only scrap of clothing the brothers had let 
her wear, and tied it around his head to stop the bleeding from 
his eye. She rushed to Brad, then Aaron, and then Heather. 
Spotting a house with white Christmas lights in the distance, 
Holly started running toward it for help—naked, skull 
shattered, and without shoes, through the snow and over 
barbed-wire fences. Each time a car passed on the nearby road, 
she feared it was the brothers returning and camouflaged 
herself by lying down in the snow. She made it to the house, 
rang the doorbell, knocked. A man opened the door, and she 
relayed as quickly as she could the events of the night to him, 
and minutes later to a 911 dispatcher, fearing that she would 
not live. 
Holly lived, and retold this play-by-play of the night’s events to 
the jury. Investigators also testified that the brothers returned 
to the Birchwood house after leaving the five friends for dead, 
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where they ransacked the place for valuables and (for good 
measure) beat Holly's dog, Nikki, to death with a golf club.184  
Sadly, those cases do not stand alone.185 The point is not 
simply that some people can do horrible, detestable, sickening 
things to others—they certainly can and have throughout history; 
everyone would concede as much. Rather, the point here is that a 
reasonable person could readily decide that some offenders do not 
deserve even to be considered for clemency. It would be difficult to 
blame governors for reaching the same conclusion. 
V. Conclusion 
For most of our history, governors granted condemned 
prisoners clemency with some degree of regularity based on factors 
such as the youth of the offender at the time of the crime, the 
presence of a mental disease or defect, and the lesser sentence 
received by a confederate for the same crime. Since the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment in Gregg 
in 1976, however, governors have granted clemency only 
infrequently. Critics, particularly steadfast opponents of capital 
punishment, have sought to explain that turnabout on the ground 
that, over the last forty years, governors have abandoned their 
duty to exercise mercy in appropriate cases.  
That criticism is mistaken. The best explanation for the 
decline in clemency grants is that the legal environment 
surrounding capital punishment today is wholly unlike the one 
that predated Gregg. Today, the capital sentencing process no 
longer leaves the decision whether a murderer should live or die to 
the unguided discretion of a jury or judge, who may not have heard 
relevant mitigating evidence. A defendant may offer the same 
mitigating evidence to a jury or judge at sentencing that, in years 
past, he would have submitted to the governor in clemency 
proceedings. Atop that, the Supreme Court has placed out of 
                                                                                                     
 184.  Id. at 638–39.  
 185. For other cases drawn from decisions by the Supreme Court and a few 
state courts of offenders who intended to make the victim(s) suffer or who were 
indifferent toward that suffering, see infra Appendix C (listing cases with 
defendants that completely disregarded the harm and pain that they inflicted on 
their victims). 
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bounds the execution of certain categories of offenders—the young, 
the mentally disabled, the less culpable—who would have been the 
most likely candidates to receive clemency under the now obsolete 
pre-Gregg capital sentencing processes, leaving only those 
offenders most deserving of death. Clemency’s critics should 
recognize that the success of capital punishment’s opponents in 
limiting the pool of clemency applicants is the likely explanation 
for the decline in clemency grants. 
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Appendix A 
Examples of Cases in Which a Murderer Was Paroled or Escaped 
from Prison and Committed Another Murder 
Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 1991). While 
serving a sentence of life imprisonment for murder, Greenawalt 
escaped with Gary Tison and murdered a family of four, which 
included a two-year-old, with repeated shotgun blasts. See Tison v. 
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139–41 (1987) (describing Tison’s 
involvement with the prison escape and murders). 
Kennedy v. Dugger, 933 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1991). While serving a 
sentence of imprisonment for murder, Kennedy escaped and later 
murdered a highway patrol officer. Id. at 907–08 
Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2014). After being 
released on parole from a second-degree murder conviction, Bomar 
murdered a college student. Id. at 1185. 
 
Dillbeck v. State, 964 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2007). Dillbeck was sentenced 
to life imprisonment for murdering a police officer, but he escaped 
and murdered a woman by repeatedly stabbing her. Id. at 97. 
People v. McRae, No. 217052, 2001 WL 788481 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 
12, 2001) vac. by 634 N.W.2d 361 (Mich. 2001). McRae appealed 
from his conviction for his 1987 murder involving acts similar to 
his 1950 murder conviction. Id. at *2. McRae’s 1950 conviction had 
been reversed on procedural grounds. 678 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Mich. 
2004). 
Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1996). Ferrell, who was 
sentenced to death for shooting his girlfriend, had a prior 
second-degree murder conviction for shooting an earlier girlfriend. 
Id. at 391. 
Geary v. State, 930 P.2d 719 (Nev. 1996), modified on other grounds 
on reh'g, 952 P.2d 431 (1998). While on parole from a 20-year-old 
murder conviction, Geary murdered his roommate. Id. at 721–22. 
Parker v. State, 456 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1984). Parker was sentenced 
to life imprisonment for murder in 1967. He was later released and 
committed another murder in Florida, one month before he 
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committed a third murder, this time in Washington, D.C. Id. at 
440. 
King v. State, 436 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1983). Previously convicted of “the 
axe-slaying of his common-law wife,” King was sentenced to death 
for murdering a woman with a blunt object to the head. Id. at 55. 
Appendix B 
Examples of Capital Cases Involving Offenders Who Committed 
Multiple Murders or Attempted Murders (Some cases could also be 
placed in Appendix C)  
White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 458 (2015) (two people murdered, 
one of whom was pregnant). 
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2193 (2015) (three people 
murdered). 
Bobby v. Mitts, 563 U.S. 395, 395 (2011) (two people murdered).  
Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 142 (2010) (three people murdered 
and two attempted murders). 
Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2007) (two people murdered, 
each victim was a woman who also was robbed and raped). 
Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 519 (2006) (two people murdered). 
Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 214 (2006) (one murder, one 
attempted murder). 
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 276 (2004) (two people 
murdered). 
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689 (2002) (two people murdered). 
Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 91 (1998) (two people murdered). 
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 271 (1998) (four people 
murdered). 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 751 (1996) (two people 
murdered). 
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 3 (1994) (two people murdered). 
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Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1993) (at least twenty-six 
people murdered). 
Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 272 (1993) (two people murdered). 
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 394 (1993) (two people murdered). 
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 112 (1991) (two people murdered). 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151–52 (1990) (two people 
murdered, three others wounded). 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139–41 (1987) (four people 
murdered, one was a two-year-old, another was 15). 
Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 148–49 (1986) (two people 
murdered). 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (three people 
murdered, along with torture, kidnapping, assaults, attempted 
murder, attempted extortion, and theft). 
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 40 n.1 (1984) (two people murdered). 
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 994–95 (1983) (one murder, one 
attempted homicide). 
Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1287 (10th Cir. 1989) (four 
people murdered). 
Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 1986) (two people 
murdered). 
Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1984) (two people 
murdered and two attempted murders). 
State v. Wells, 864 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Idaho 1993) (two people 
murdered). 
Baze v. Com., 965 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. 1997) (two people 
murdered). 
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Appendix C 
Examples of Capital Cases Involving Offenders Who Intended to 
Make the Victim(s) Suffer or Who Were Indifferent Toward that 
Suffering (Some cases could also be placed in Appendix B)  
Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006). Respondent unexpectedly 
encountered the nineteen-year-old victim while burglarizing a 
home and struck her in the head fifteen to twenty times with a 
steel dumbbell. Id. at 11 
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006). Respondent broke into the 
home of Marry Ane Pusch and waited for her to return. Id. at 166. 
Upon arrival, he shot her, stabbed her, and slit her throat. 
Respondent then set the house on fire, burning Pusch’s toddler 
alive. Id.  
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Petitioner was convicted 
by a jury for two counts of first-degree murder as well as one count 
of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree. Id. at 
811. A jury sentenced him to death for his murders and thirty years 
for his assault. Id. The Court described the gruesome scene of the 
crime: 
The victims of Payne’s offenses were 28-year-old Charisse 
Christopher, her 2-year-old daughter Lacie, and her 3-year-old 
son Nicholas. . . . [I]nside the apartment, the police encountered 
a horrifying scene. Blood covered the walls and floor throughout 
the unit. Charisse and her children were lying on the floor in 
the kitchen. Nicholas, despite several wounds inflicted by a 
butcher knife that completely penetrated through his body from 
front to back, was still breathing. Miraculously, he survived, but 
not until after undergoing seven hours of surgery and a 
transfusion of 1,700 cc's of blood—400 to 500 cc's more than his 
estimated normal blood volume. Charisse and Lacie were dead.  
Charisse’s body was found on the kitchen floor on her back, her 
legs fully extended. She had sustained 42 direct knife wounds 
and 42 defensive wounds on her arms and hands. The wounds 
were caused by 41 separate thrusts of a butcher knife. None of 
the 84 wounds inflicted by Payne were individually fatal; 
rather, the cause of death was most likely bleeding from all of 
the wounds. 
Id. at 811–13. 
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Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990). Petitioner and accomplice, 
Charles Lane, tortured and murdered Frances Arwood, a woman 
whom he thought had given drugs to his girlfriend’s children. Id. 
at 229–30. The Court discussed the heinous nature of the attack, 
explaining that, 
For reasons that are not clear, petitioner and Lane struck 
Arwood repeatedly with their fists and dragged her by the hair 
into the bathroom. There they stripped the victim naked, 
literally kicked her into the bathtub, and subjected her to 
scalding, dunkings, and additional beatings. Petitioner left 
Lane to guard the victim, and apparently to rape her, while 
petitioner went to the kitchen to boil water to scald her. 
Petitioner kicked Arwood in the chest, causing her head to 
strike the tub or a windowsill and rendering her unconscious. 
The pair then dragged Arwood into the living room, where they 
continued to beat and kick her. Petitioner poured lighter fluid 
on the unconscious victim, particularly her torso and genital 
area, and set the lighter fluid afire. He told Lane that he had 
done this to show “just how cruel he could be.”  
Id. at 230. 
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). After bragging to 
his friends that he was going to rob a disabled hitchhiker who he 
had driven by on the road, petitioner brought the man to his car 
and demanded his money. Id. at 301. Dissatisfied with the amount 
of money the hitchhiker possessed, petitioner pulled out his 
revolver, pulled to the side of the road into a field, and searched 
the man. Id. Petitioner forced the man to lie on the ground, 
returned to his friends to tell them that he was going to shoot the 
disabled man, then returned to the victim and shot him in his head. 
Id. at 301–02. 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). The defendant was 
convicted of murder, robbery, and assault with intent to kill. Id. at 
170. He was sentenced to death for his gruesome crimes. Id. After 
killing a man, the defendant then forced the first victim’s wife to 
perform oral sex while on the floor next to her husband’s body. Id. 
at 172. Defendant then shot a teenage boy who came into the store 
to make sure everything was ok. Id. at 173. 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). The defendant was 
convicted of first-degree murder for killing an eleven-year-old boy. 
Id. at 414. The defendant and his accomplice previously discussed 
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killing a human while on hunting trips. Id. The boy suffocated from 
being gagged and stuffed in a truck. Id. After the defendant and 
his accomplice killed him, they performed various sexual and 
violent acts on the body. Id.  
Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983). Respondent kidnapped a 
ten-year-old boy from a school bus stop in Florida. Id. at 79. He 
sexually assaulted the boy and killed him. Id. Respondent then 
kidnapped two more young boys, one of whom he killed in Virginia. 
Id. During his sentencing for the Florida murder, respondent 
described his crime in graphic detail and gloated that he was 
extremely proud of his killing and would do it again if given the 
chance. Id. at 79–80. 
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion). The 
four defendants in this case were members of a group called the 
“BLACK LIBERATION ARMY.”  Id. at 942. Their goal was to kill 
white people indiscriminately and to start a revolution and racial 
war. Id. The defendants randomly selected their white victim, 
drove him to a dump, and repeatedly stabbed him. Id. After the 
murder, they left a note on the body discussing their revolutionary 
race war goals. Id. at 943. 
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). The court convicted 
petitioner of first-degree murder of his nine-year-old daughter and 
seven-year-old son. Id. at 284. The court also found him guilty of 
torturing his eleven-year-old son and abusing his five-year-old 
daughter. Id. at 285. The trial judge described the crimes, 
explaining that the “evidence and testimony showed premeditated 
and continuous torture, brutality, sadism and unspeakable horrors 
committed against all of the children over a period of time.” Id. 
Boyle v. State, 154 So. 3d 171 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013). The jury 
sentenced the defendant to death for killing a two-year-old girl. Id. 
at 183. After defendant brought her to a hospital, doctors found 
significant head trauma. Id. The doctor who conducted the autopsy 
determined that the girl died as a result of brain swelling from 
blunt-force trauma and that her brain swelled to such a degree 
that part of it broke off and pushed into her spinal cord. Id. The 
victims’ sister testified that the week before her sister’s death she 
saw defendant hit the toddler against the car door and also throw 
her against a wall the night before her death. Id. at 183–84. 
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Gobble v. State, 104 So. 3d 920 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). Defendant 
was convicted of murdering her baby. Id. at 935. The four-month-
old boy died “as a result of blunt-force trauma to his head,” with 
fractured skull, ribs, right arm, both wrists, “multiple bruises on 
his face, head, neck, and chest and a tear in the inside his mouth 
that was consistent with a bottle having been shoved into his 
mouth.” Id.  
Wilson v. State, 751 S.W.2d 734 (Ark. 1988). The defendant raped, 
bound, and strangled his first victim with a telephone cord. Id. at 
735. The next day, he then beat and raped a second victim on the 
hood of her car in a parking lot. Id. His second victim survived, but 
underwent life-threatening surgery to treat a blood clot in her 
brain that resulted from the beating. Id.  
People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1990). The victim was 
raped, sodomized, and stabbed around twenty-eight times with a 
folding knife. Id. at 969. The evidence revealed that it was the 
killer’s intention to torture the victim before she died, 
demonstrated by the shallow nature of the cuts around her neck. 
Id. at 969–70. 
State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363 (Conn. 2003). The defendant 
bludgeoned his thirteen-year-old victim to death by repeated blows 
to the head with a three-pound sledgehammer. Id. at 375. 
Correll v. State, 523 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1988). Defendant was 
sentenced to death for killing his ex-wife, his five-year-old 
daughter, his ex-wife’s sister, and their mother. Id. at 564. Each 
victim died from massive hemorrhaging, caused by multiple stab 
wounds. Id.  
State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702 (Mo. 2004). The defendant was 
convicted of killing a mother and child. Id. at 710. The mother was 
stabbed twenty-one times and had five slash wounds while the 
two-year-old child was stabbed nine times and had twelve slash 
wounds. Id.  
Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). Petitioner 
was sentenced to death for his crimes of conspiracy, first-degree 
burglary, assault with a dangerous weapon, forcible oral sodomy, 
first-degree rape, kidnapping, robbery, as well as first-degree 
murder. Id. at 421.  
THE DEMISE OF CAPITAL CLEMENCY 1357 
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 516 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1986). The defendant 
was sentenced to death for rape and murder of a twelve-year-old 
girl. 
State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 2000). The defendant was 
sentenced to death for the rape and murder of an eight-year-old 
girl. Id. at 201 
State v. Davidson, No. E2013-00394-CCA-R3-DD, 2015 Tenn. 
Crim. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015). 
Defendant gruesomely raped and killed two victims, C.C. and C.N. 
The medical examiner described the heinous nature of the crimes:  
C.N. had been bound at the ankles by a belt and a strip of fabric 
and at the wrists with “something like a shoelace.” He had also 
been blindfolded and gagged, and his head had been wrapped in 
a sweatshirt. Based upon the location of unburned skin on his 
body, she determined that he had been wrapped in “some sort 
of comforter and placed face up” before being set on fire. C.N. 
suffered three gunshot wounds. A contact gunshot wound to his 
head severed his brain stem, causing “instantaneous death.” A 
gunshot wound “between the back of the neck and the 
shoulders” did not “cause any major damage.” Another gunshot 
wound entered C.N.’s back and traveled “steeply upward” where 
it caused severe damage to his spinal cord. Lacerations, 
abrasions, and bruising in the area of C.N.’s anus indicated anal 
penetration that occurred before his death. . . . C.C.’s body was 
inside the trash can, and strips of fabric had been used to bind 
her body into a fetal position. A small plastic bag had been tied 
around her head, and then her body had been placed in five 
different large garbage bags before being placed into the trash 
can. She was nude from the waist down. The autopsy findings 
indicated that C.C. died inside the trash can of a combination of 
positional asphyxiation due to the position of her body, 
suffocation due to the plastic bag on her face, and mechanical 
asphyxiation due to being placed in the confined space of the 
trash can with bedding. Blood and other fluids were smeared 
around her abdomen and upper chest. She suffered 
“excoriations”—“like a carpet burn”—to her lower back and 
upper buttocks. C.C.’s anogenital region sustained “tremendous 
damage.” She had tears to her vagina and rectum as well as 
severe blunt force trauma to the area. Doctor Mileusnic-Polchan 
explained,  
[T]he whole area was just a blunt-force trauma which is 
bruising, contusion, and abrasions, and lacerations. . . . The 
depth of the injury was so grave that there’s no way that just a 
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regular rape could—could inflict this. . . . [T]his is an object 
coming in contact with the body to inflict the serious injury of 
this kind. C.C. also suffered blunt force trauma to her head, 
contusions on her shoulders, bruising on her arms, and a small 
cut on her hand. She suffered a torn frenulum, which was likely 
caused by something being forcefully put into her mouth. C.C.’s 
blood was negative for drugs and alcohol. 
Id. at *11–13. 
Archuleta v. Galetka, 267 P.3d 232 (Utah 2011). The victim in this 
case was kidnapped and driven to an isolated area. He was then  
[B]ound . . . with tire chains and a bungee cord . . . . 
[R]emoved . . . from the trunk and [defendants] attached 
battery cables to his testicles and to the car battery in a failed 
attempt to electrocute him. They inflicted severe blows to 
[victim]'s head with a tire jack and tire iron. And they inserted 
the tire iron into [victim]'s rectum, forcing it eighteen inches 
into his body and puncturing his liver. . . . [Victim] was found 
naked from the waist down, with a gag around his mouth and 
the tire chains wrapped tightly around his neck. 
Id. at 241, ¶ 4. 
